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MAKING SENSE OF DALE 
David McGowan* 
Things are often more complex than they seem, even when 
they seem complex. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1 the Su-
preme Court held that the Boy Scouts have a right under the 
speech clause to exclude an openly gay man from being a 
Scoutmaster. The man in question was also, in the Court's view, 
a gay rights activist. The Court held that this right trumped New 
Jersey's law against discrimination in employment and public ac-
commodations. In greatly simplified terms, there are two ways of 
looking at this ruling. 
Easy case; rightly decided. 
Dale was an easy case. James Dale was openly gay. If he 
was a Scoutmaster, then people would think that the Scouts 
think that being gay is acceptable. The Scouts don't think that. 
In fact, the Scouts think just the opposite, though they would 
prefer to be polite about their opposition rather than making an 
explicit point of it. It makes no difference whether the Scouts ac-
tually teach boys that homosexuality is wrong. Dale would send 
a message just by being openly gay, and the Scouts have a consti-
tutional right not to be forced to express any messages they do 
not want to express. There would be no point in analyzing the 
Scouts' message anyway, for the Court could not constitutionally 
pass judgment on that message in any respect. The Scouts there-
fore may exclude Dale regardless whether they teach anything 
about sex or homosexuality. Their statement in court that they 
do not wish to express the message Dale personifies is enough to 
defeat New Jersey's anti-discrimination law. 
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121 
122 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:121 
There is considerable power in this view. If it is correct, 
Dale is a significant departure from previous cases and sets a 
new direction in First Amendment law. One of the main ques-
tions about Dale is whether we should interpret the Court's 
opinion as adopting this view. The result in the case and some of 
the Court's language suggest that we should. 
But the Court has never held that personal characteristics 
such as race, gender, or sexual orientation are inherently expres-
sive within the meaning of the speech clause. (I will refer to 
such a theory as one of "expressive identity. ") 2 The Court did 
not expressly adopt such a theory in Dale; it instead repeatedly 
referred to Dale as a gay rights activist. To say that personal 
characteristics are speech would require a second look at many 
anti-discrimination statutes. The expressive identity notion also 
calls into question precedents holding that women had to be 
admitted to the Rotary and the Jaycees, but the Court did not 
say it was overruling those cases. 
Hard case; at least partly wrong. 
Dale was a hard case. In the Scouts' favor, constitutionally 
protected expression is sometimes the product of the association 
of persons who wish to make a common point. An early state-
ment of the modern expressive association right is found in 
NAACP v. Alabama,3 an important case in the civil rights battles 
that produced so much of our modern constitutional law. The 
scope of a right cannot depend on one's view of the persons 
against whom it is used. The same right used by the NAACP to 
fight majority imposition of racial apartheid is fully available to 
the Scouts to fight majority imposition of homosexual tolerance. 
Moreover, some advocates of gay and lesbian rights argue 
that sexual identity, if openly proclaimed, is a form of expression 
that deserves constitutional protection.4 In Dale, this argument 
2. The phrase is Professor Hunter's. See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Re-
cuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Nan D. Hunter, 
Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1695 (1993). 
3. 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958). 
4. Professors Cole, Eskridge and Hunter have each developed arguments along 
these lines. E.g., David Cole, Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and 
the Right of Association, 1999 S. Ct. Rev. 203; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Chal-
lenging the Apartheid of the Closet 176 (Harvard U. Press, 1999) ("An admission of sex-
ual identity is expressive in the strictest sense of the word"); Hunter, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. (cited in note 2). My own view is that many acts and statements can be expres-
sive, and that questions of constitutional protection depend heavily upon the context and 
manner in which expression is communicated and perceived, as well as upon the pur-
poses of particular free speech doctrines. See, for example, Robert C. Post, Recuperating 
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favored the Scouts. If a declaration of sexual orientation gives 
one a free speech right not to be kicked out of the military, such 
a declaration also counts as expression for purposes of the Boy 
Scouts' right not to be forced to express messages with which 
they disagree. On the other hand, as just noted, the Court has 
not endorsed a theory of expressive identity and lower courts 
have not been notably receptive to the theory.5 Because the 
Court did not hold that personal characteristics are free speech, 
one could argue, admitting Dale could not amount to compelled 
expression. 
And the most analogous precedents favored Dale in impor-
tant ways. If the Court had scrutinized the evidence of the 
Scouts' expressive activity as it did with the Jaycees and the Ro-
tary, the record suggested that the Scouts (as a national organi-
zation apart from the local sponsors who actually instruct the 
boys), do not have common beliefs or teachings about homo-
sexuality. Under previous interpretations of the right of expres-
sive association, the lack of such common beliefs and the lack of 
any express teachings about homosexuality would undercut the 
Scouts' claim. On this view, the opinion reflects mostly the skill-
ful manipulation and dodging of precedents to reach a desired 
result. 
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249 (1995); Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on 
Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings L.J. 
921 (1993). 
Treating a declaration of sexual identity as expressive is not likely to help us resolve 
actual cases. Theories of pure associational rights or expressive identity tend to rest at 
least in part on free speech theories of autonomy, self-realization, or closely related 
ideas. E.g., Cole, 1999 S. Ct. Rev. at 230; Eskridge, Gaylaw at 178-79; Hunter, 35 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 4-5 (cited in note 2). Such theories have a troubled history because 
either side in virtually any case can claim that the activity at issue advances or limits their 
autonomy and ability fully to realize their personalities. Dale's complete realization of 
his sexual identity by coming out as a gay man can be countered by the claim of some 
within the Scouts that their autonomy is impinged by Dale's assertion of his own; the de-
sire of Nazis to express anti-Semitism harms Jews and therefore impinges on their self-
realization. See David F. McGowan and Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of 
University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 825, 844-45 (1991). Such 
broad theories are also indifferent to context, which plays a critical role in reconciling 
competing demands in free speech cases. E.g., Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: 
Democracy, Community, Management 16 (Harvard U. Press, 1995). Because self-
realization and autonomy may be achieved in an essentially unlimited number of ways, 
these principles cannot explain why speech should receive more protection than freely 
regulated activities. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 48 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1982). For a concise summary of arguments on this point, see 
Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 3-4 (Foundation Press, 1998). 
5. Cases rejecting such claims are collected in Eskridge, Gaylaw at 429 n.2 (cited 
in note 4). 
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This essay examines these competing views and attempts to 
sort out what is right and wrong in each of them. My aim is to 
determine where the doctrine of expressive association stands 
after Dale. In particular, Dale poses the question of just what the 
expressive association doctrine protects. Is it the ability of 
groups to express their ideas, the ability of certain types of 
groups to manage their affairs without government interference, 
or a hybrid right the core of which is expression but which also 
protects from state interference some degree of managerial dis-
cretion necessary to make sure the group's message is ex-
pressed?6 In my view the third of these options best captures the 
opinion, but the Court's opinion obscures this fact and leaves the 
doctrine in an uncertain state. 
In the course of the essay I offer two conjectures about the 
facts of the case. The first is that the Scouts wish to exclude 
openly gay men to reassure parents that their boys will be safe 
from homosexual advances. The second is that the message the 
Scouts defended was a political compromise among sponsors of 
Boy Scout troops, who appear to disagree about homosexuality. 
I believe there is a reasonable basis for each conjecture, but I do 
not claim that either or both of them represent the "true" story 
of the case. Their role here is heuristic. My arguments, in brief, 
are these: 
• The Court's analysis was cursory and conflicting. In a case 
where the Court said the facts and law were virtually insepa-
rable, it resolved two of the three factual questions at issue 
by deferring to assertions in the Scouts' briefs. In a case 
where the Court began by demonstrating that the Scouts are 
a group with an expressive purpose, it then limited its inquiry 
to avoid asking whether the Scouts' expression had anything 
to do with homosexuality, while simultaneously saying that a 
group could not defeat an anti-discrimination law just by 
claiming that "mere acceptance" of a person protected by 
the law would impair the group's expression. (Parts II and 
V) 
6. Some might be tempted to say that managerial discretion and expression cannot 
be separated. That position is undercut to some degree by the Court's statement that a 
group could not establish a constitutional defense to an anti-discrimination law "simply 
by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its 
message." Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. And the countless regulations that constrain the ability 
of groups to manage their affairs-from marginal tax rates to fire codes to wage and hour 
rules- also effect their expression. It does not follow that such regulations should be ana-
lyzed as restrictions on speech. Cf. Alexander, 44 Hastings L.J. at 930-31 (cited in note 
4). 
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• The Court's stated deference was inconsistent with its analy-
sis in prior cases, raised questions about the degree to which 
the speech clause protects expression rather than the mana-
gerial discretion of expressive groups, and left the doctrine in 
an unsettled state. (Parts II and V) 
• The Scouts' decentralized organizational structure compli-
cated the case significantly. The national Scouting body sets 
and interprets policy, but local troops actually express the 
Scouts' messages. Groups of sponsors filed briefs on both 
sides of the case suggesting that local troops deviate signifi-
cantly from the message the Scouts defended in litigation, 
and which the Court accepted as a matter of deference. 
(Parts III and IV) 
• Group expression is different from either individual expres-
sion or the free exercise of religious beliefs. A group's ex-
pression is the product of the common beliefs and interests 
around which its members form. Determining whether 
compelled association impairs a group's expression, or forces 
the group to express views it has a right not to express, re-
quires analysis of the relationship between the group mem-
bers' common beliefs and interests and the characteristics of 
the person the group wishes to exclude. (Part I) 
• The Court was right to insist that it would not try to resolve 
differences of interpretation about a group's tenets. The 
only relevant question was whether the Scouts expressed a 
message sufficiently related to homosexuality that Dale's 
presence would alter it. That question cannot be answered 
solely by deference to litigation positions, however. In order 
to keep the right of expressive association tied to expression, 
a court must analyze the relationship between the group's 
common beliefs and interests and the person it wishes to ex-
clude. (Part V) 
• The Court has left us with a right that protects group expres-
sion and includes some protection for managerial decisions 
related to that expression. The Court's deference and its 
terse opinion leave us with little guidance on how far mana-
gerial discretion will be protected in order to protect a 
group's expression. The Court's reasoning would have been 
better had it focused more closely on the messages the 
Scouts actually expressed. The Court could have done this 
by acknowledging that the actual speech at issue occurred at 
the local level and holding that New Jersey's anti-
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discrimination law be applied on a troop-by-troop basis. 
(Part VI) 
I. THE NATURE OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
Because one cannot assess claims of expressive association 
without some theory of how associations form and communicate 
messages, I begin with that subject. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
DOCTRINE 
Current expressive association doctrine can be traced to the 
Court's opinion in United States v. Cruikshank. 7 Cruikshank in-
volved the Enforcement Act,8 one of the Reconstruction statutes 
designed to guarantee blacks the enjoyment of their new civil 
rights, in particular the right to vote.9 The statute made it a 
crime to "band or conspire together" to oppress any citizen or 
"hinder his free exercise ... of an~ right ... secured to him by 
the Constitution" or federal law. 1 The indictment alleged in 
part that the defendants had banded together and conspired to 
deprive black citizens of their right to assemble for peaceful and 
lawful purposes.11 
The question was whether the indictment alleged a depriva-
tion of a federal right. The Slaughter-House Cases defined the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to in-
clude a right "to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances .... "12 The Cruikshank Court drew on this concept, 
saying that "[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form, 
implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for 
7. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
8. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (repealed 1894). 
9. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548. For a history of the statute and Cruikshank, sec 
Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and 
Reunion 1864-1888 at 145 (Macmillan Publishing Co., 1987). 
10. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548. 
11. Id. at 551. Professor Fairman reports that the case arose from the "Colfax Mas-
sacre" of 1873. Beginning in a dispute over which officers retained power after an elec-
tion, fighting ended with black citizens retreating to a church which, after women and 
children were allowed to leave, was set on fire by the whites on the scene. Some of the 
men inside the church were shot while fleeing, some died inside, and others were exe-
cuted later. Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion at 262 (cited in note 9). Eric Foner 
states that this massacre was the most violent riot of the Reconstruction era. Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction: American's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877 at 437 (Harper & Row, 
1988). 
12. 83 u.s. 36,79 (1872). 
2001] MAKING SENSE OF DALE 127 
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a re-
dress of grievances." 13 
The problem in Cruikshank was that the indictment did not 
allege that the blacks whose assembly had been broken up were 
meeting to petition the federal government.14 The indictment 
was therefore too broad. The right of assembly was bounded by 
the purpose of the assembled, and the indictment did not allege 
that the assembly was for the purpose of petitioning the national 
government. The Court therefore held that breaking up the as-
sembly did not violate a national right. 
Using the approach taken in the Slaughter-House Cases, the 
Cruikshank Court linked association to the petition clause, and 
thus to core political speech. The Court then began to expand 
protection of association in cases where an assembly related to 
public speech on matters of general public concern. In DeJonge 
v. Oregon, for example, Chief Justice Hughes quoted Cruik-
shank's language linkin§ the right of assembly and petition to 
republican government. 5 That DeJonge reversed a conviction 
for a speech concerning a strike, made at a meeting of the Com-
munist party, is a good measure of the changes in the doctrine to 
that point. But the Court still cast the doctrine in fairly conven-
tional terms of public speech on matters of general interest hav-
ing an obvious relationship to self-governance.16 
This concept of expressive association fit well with the sub-
versive advocacy cases that came to the Court early in the first 
half of the 20th Century. During the same period, however, the 
Court was also dealing with cases involving freedom of con-
13. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. 
14. "The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning 
Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or 
duties of the national government, is .... under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the 
United States .... If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants 
was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, 
and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States. Such, however, is not the 
case. The offence, as stated in the indictment, will be made out, if it be shown that the 
object of the conspiracy was to prevent a meeting for any lawful purpose whatever." Id. 
at 552-53. 
15. 299 u.s. 353, 364 (1937). 
16. An interesting aspect of the early cases was the Court's willingness to affirm 
convictions based on membership in an organization even if the member in question had 
opposed the policies for which the group as a whole was condemned. Anita Whitney, for 
example, was arrested after a meeting at which she had argued that violence should be 
rejected and that protests should be made using the ballot. Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927). Whitney was charged with being a leader of the group, however, not 
just a member. See Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in Amer-
ica 244 (Harper & Row, 1988). 
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science. These cases mainly involved the raising of children or 
the claims of minority religious &roups to practice their faith not-
withstanding general state laws. 7 Though the two lines of cases 
differed, the Court saw a connection between freedom of 
conscience generally and freedom to express one's views. The 
Court linked both freedoms to the freedom to assemble. Justice 
Rutledge's opinion in Thomas v. Collins exemplifies the point: 
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to free-
dom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty 
with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to pe-
tition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identi-
cal, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, and therefore 
are united in the First Article's assurance. This conjunction 
of liberties is not peculiar to religious activity and institutions 
alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same 
. f d f . 18 secunty as ree om o conscience. 
This language from Thomas is interesting in part because it 
seems at best marginally relevant to the case. A Texas statute 
required that paid labor organizers register with the state and 
obtain an organizer's card. On his way to speak at a rally, Tho-
mas was served with an order enjoining him from speaking be-
cause he had not registered. He violated the order and was fined 
and jailed for contempt. The Court held that the Texas statute 
infringed Thomas's freedom of speech, concluding that a state 
could not impose a licensing requirement on speech that enjoyed 
the full protection of the First Amendment. 
The Court began the quotation above by citing DeJonge, 
the facts of which were reasonably close to Thomas's labor or-
ganizing. But the Court ended the quotation by citing Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, Meyer v. Nebraska, and Prince v. Massachu-
setts.19 The first two cases are well known for advancing parental 
rights in the instruction of children; the latter is one of the 
Court's many cases involving the free exercise rights of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses. 
These freedom of conscience cases seem out of place in 
Thomas, unless one reads Justice Rutledge as objecting to the 
Texas statute both because it unlawfully burdened Thomas's 
speech and because it forced him to declare his personal convic-
17. E.g. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
18. 323 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1945) (citations omitted). 
19. Sec note 17. 
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tions to the state. Thomas made a living by declaring these con-
victions in public, so the point might not have been a large one 
in his case. For other persons who wished to form and develop 
their beliefs privately, however, the burden might be signifi-
cant.20 
The Court cited Thomas in NAACP v. Alabama, the case 
that established the basis for the current form of the doctrine.21 
That case established that a group has standing to assert the 
speech and association rights of its members, extended the right 
to private activity within a group in addition to the more tradi-
tional public rallies and speeches at issue in previous cases, and 
adopted an explicitly instrumental rationale for the doctrine. 
The Court said that 
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by 
group association, as this Court has more than once recog-
nized by remarking upon the close nexus between the free-
doms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that free-
dom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial 
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association per-
tain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and 
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the free-
dom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.22 
All law is purposive, and the Court's statement of the doc-
trine of expressive association was no exception. Under 
NAACP v. Alabama, group association is protected because it 
enhances effective advocacy. 23 Runyon v. McCrary confirmed 
20. In this sense, one might read Collins as a precursor to Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960), in which the Court struck down an Arkansas statute requiring public 
school teachers to disclose the organizations to which they belonged or had belonged in 
the preceding five years. In context, the case appeared to be an effort by Arkansas to 
identify and root out teachers who supported the NAACP. Shelton did not cite Thomas 
v. Collins, but it did cite DeJonge. 
21. On the importance of the case, and of roughly contemporaneous cases involving 
membership in subversive organizations, see Cole, 1999 S. Ct. Rev. at 207 (cited in note 
4). 
22. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958) (citations omitted). 
23. As Judge Easterbrook described it, NAACP v. Alabama held that "association 
is protected as an implicit constitutional right to the extent it makes the explicit constitu· 
tiona! right more valuable, and that the Constitution forbids steps ... that reduce the ef· 
fectiveness of the association." Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit Rights of Ex-
pression, 10 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 91, 94 (1987). 
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the point. The Court there said it has "recognized a First 
Amendment right 'to engage in association for the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas .... ' That right is protected because it pro-
motes and may well be essential to the '[e]ffective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones' that the First Amendment is designed to foster." 24 
This language casts the expressive association doctrine as an 
instrumental adjunct to the speech clause. In this respect, the 
expressive association doctrine is similar to the actual malice 
rule25 and the overbreadth doctrine. 26 Those doctrines suspend 
the operation of state laws that might penalize protected speech 
in order to decrease the risk of liability and thereby encourage 
the production of speech.v Those doctrines thus represent a 
bargain: Some cost is incurred-such as damage to the reputa-
tion of a public figure who is the subject of a false but not mali-
cious report-and in return society gets the "uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open" debate the speech clause is designed to protect.28 
On this view, the expressive association doctrine would provide 
little if any protection against anti-discrimination laws to groups 
that wish to remain silent on a topic rather than speaking, unless 
the silence was necessary to facilitate the communication of a 
message actually expressed. 
Constitutional protection of association is not limited to the 
speech clause. In language reminiscent of Thomas v. Collins, the 
Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees referred to "a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for 
the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion" that was 
protected "as an indispensable means of preserving other indi-
vidualliberties."29 In New York State Club Association v. New 
York, the Court spoke in similar terms, saying that "[t]he ability 
and the opportunity to combine with others to advance one's 
views is a powerful practical means of ensuring the perpetuation 
24. 427 U.S. 160, 175 (1976), quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460. 
25. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
26. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
27. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1321 
(1992). 
28. See David McGowan and Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action 
and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 293, 383 
(1994) (footnote omitted). 
29. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
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of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed to indi-
viduals as against the government. "30 
On these descriptions, the doctrine is still instrumental- it is 
designed to facilitate the exercise of the specified rights- but its 
scope is the same as the First Amendment as a whole. As Pro-
fessor Cole described the existing doctrine, in an article arguing 
for the development of a freestanding right of association, "asso-
ciation is not mentioned in the First Amendment, the Court rea-
sons, but deserves protection ... because it is a necessary means 
to the ends that are expressly mentioned-speech, assembly, pe-
tition, and religion. "31 The doctrine is penumbral; it assists in the 
enjoyment of other rights but does not stand on its own. 
Dale is a hard case in part because the Scouts' litigation po-
sition defended silence on the topic of homosexuality, and in-
deed on matters of sexuality in general, while claiming a penum-
bral right of disassociation based on the speech clause. The 
Court's opinion is difficult to analyze in part because it based its 
crucial deference to the Scouts' assertions in large part on a free 
exercise case. The balance of this essay explores the complexities 
this approach creates and, in particular, what interest this doc-
trine protects. 
B. THE STRUCTURE OF GROUP EXPRESSION 
In addition to describing expressive association as an in-
strumental doctrine, the Court in Roberts referred to a right of 
association designed to protect "the ability of the original mem-
bers to express only those views that brought them together."32 
It was this right that the Court held "plainly presupposes a free-
dom not to associate. "33 
Without explaining why, the Dale Court subtly shifted away 
from the language of Roberts and the theory of group expression 
that language implied. The opinion in Dale quotes the "plainly 
presupposes" language from Roberts, and it quotes other lan-
guage from earlier in the same paragraph of the Roberts opinion. 
But the Dale Court then skips over Roberts' reference to the 
30. 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). Indeed, in New York State Club Association, Justice 
Scalia concurred in part to note that the Court "assumes for purposes of its analysis, but 
does not hold, the existence of a constitutional right of private association for other than 
expressive or religious purposes." Id. at 20. 
31. Cole, 1999 S. Ct. Rev. at 208 (cited in note 4). 
32. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
33. Id. 
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ability of groups "to express only the views that brought them 
together." For this language Dale substitutes a reference to "the 
ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, 
that it intends to express."34 With this shift in language, the 
Court foreshadowed its treatment of the Scouts as equivalent to 
an individual speaker and its refusal to consider facts relevant to 
a~pects of group expression that differ from individual expres-
Sion. 
Neither Roberts nor Dale actually develops a theory of 
group expression. This lack of development is a problem. One 
cannot analyze expressive association cases without some under-
lying theory of how associations express themselves. As a mat-
ter of both logic and common sense, the Roberts Court's focus 
on the common beliefs and interests of group members provides 
the best basis for analyzing the expression of the group itself. 
The following description of how groups form and express mes-
sages draws on this portion of Roberts to suggest a workable 
structure for deciding expressive association cases.35 
Expressive associations are not formed by random selec-
tion. Members of such associations are brought together by the 
beliefs and interests they have in common. Common beliefs and 
interests are what constitute a group, defining its social practices 
and purposes. Common beliefs and interests also constitute a 
group in the mind of the general public, expressing what the 
group is and is not about and distinguishing it from other groups. 
Membership in the Catholic Church implies certain views on re-
ligion, but nothing about the proper interpretation of the Second 
Amendment. Membership in the National Rifle Association 
implies the reverse. 
Association, standing alone, does not imply group expres-
sion. Persons attending an opera, a sporting event, or going to a 
dance hall are associating in some sense, but their act of associa-
tion does not produce expression within the meaning of the 
speech clause.3 Nor is a group's expression simply the sum or 
34. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
35. Dale itself is not consistent with the approach outlined in this Part. I discuss the 
Dale Court's treatment of group expression in Part V. The theory described here is also 
partly at odds with Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts, in which she treats group 
expression as cumulative of the individual characteristics of the members. See 468 U.S. 
at 632. 
36. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989). The court there upheld a 
city ordinance limiting adult access to "teenage" dance halls. The Court accepted that 
the opportunity to dance with adults "might be described as 'associational' in co~mon 
parlance," but said this opportunity did "not mvolve the sort of expressive associatiOn 
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the average of the various individual beliefs of its members. 
Composition and division are as much fallacies with respect to 
the expression of groups as they are elsewhere. That some NRA 
members are Christians does not make the NRA a religious 
group with a religious message; that the NRA expresses no reli-
gious message does not imply that its members are irreligious. 
To refer to the message of a group, as a group, is to refer only to 
the beliefs and interests that its members hold in common. 
Group membership does not imply complete agreement 
among group members with respect to the common beliefs and 
interests that define the group. Some NRA members may favor 
regulation of armor-piercing bullets, while others may oppose it. 
Such disagreements do not necessarily imply that the group itself 
lacks meaningful common beliefs or interests, however, nor that 
the group itself expresses no message the public can understand. 
The public as a whole still understands that the NRA and its 
members generally embrace the right to bear arms and oppose 
restrictions on guns. 
The beliefs and practices of expressive groups are not fixed, 
and the messages a group expresses to its members and to soci-
ety may change over time. Changes within a group may also dis-
sipate its expression. Disagreements within a group may be-
come so pronounced that they undermine the commonality of 
beliefs and interests on which the group's expression rests. In 
that case, such disagreements would effectively disable the 
membership of a group from expressing any coherent message as 
a group. Some group members might then re-form around a dif-
ferent set of common beliefs and interests, which would then 
constitute the basis for the message the re-formed group ex-
pressed. Such changes are to be expected, but in each case the 
group's message is expressed by its common beliefs, the absence 
of which implies that the group, as a group, expresses no mes-
sage at all. 
Because members of an association are brought together by 
common interests or beliefs, which in turn are the source of our 
understanding of the group and its message, membership in a 
group can be relevant to the group's expression. Forced associa-
that the First Amendment has been held to protect. The hundreds of teenagers who 
congregate each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized as-
sociation; they are patrons of the same business establishment. Most are strangers to one 
another, and the dance hall admits all who are willing to pay the admission fcc. There is 
no suggestion that these patrons 'take positions on public questions' or perform any of 
the other similar activities" that the Court had discussed in Roberts. I d. 
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tion with persons an organization condemns, for example, would 
undercut the organization's message, which would include the 
implication that members of the denigrated group are unaccept-
able associates. The Ku Klux Klan hates blacks; to force the 
Klan to admit blacks would impair the Klan's message. Forced 
association with persons an organization does not condemn-the 
elderly, perhaps-would leave its expression unimpaired. 
As a group's common beliefs or interests become more 
general, its membership becomes broader. More people will 
agree with the group's tenets, and fewer people will be excluded. 
Any message implied by the group's composition will become 
correspondingly fainter and more diffuse. To be a member of 
the Klan is to be racist. To be a member of the Catholic Church 
is to believe in God. To be a member of the Rotary is ... not so 
clear.37 
As these examples suggest, when a group's members hold in 
common only very general beliefs-such as a belief in "good" 
government or "responsible" citizenship-the group and its 
composition express little if anything relevant to the personal 
characteristics of its members, such as religiosity, race, gender, 
or sexual orientation. Compelled association with the irrelig-
ious, or with blacks, women, or gays, therefore would not impair 
the group's expression, and thus would not deprive the group it-
self of the freedom of speech. 
Courts therefore must carefully examine the facts of cases in 
which groups claim a right of expression against legal rules 
forbidding discrimination in membership. Such claims rest on 
the premise that the composition of a group supports expression 
protected by the speech clause. Because a group's expression is 
based on the beliefs and interests its members hold in common, 
courts cannot seriously analyze claims of expressive association 
without examining the relationship between the person the 
group wishes to exclude and the beliefs and interests around 
which the members have formed. 
Courts should not scrutinize the plausibility of a group's 
tenets. Such scrutiny would pose a risk of deterring believers 
from expressing their true beliefs, and courts are not well-
equipped to evaluate such matters. The speech clause protects 
37. If the answer is "to favor values of good citizenship and commercial practice," it 
is at least a partial answer to say "who doesn't"? One would get at the particular mes-
sage of the Rotary, to the extent it had one, only by focusing on the common interests 
and beliefs that distinguish its members from others who hold such general views. 
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implausible as well as plausible expression. But it does protect 
expression, and not unexpressed feelings of discomfort, disgust, 
or aversion to associating with a particular class of persons. So 
while the plausibility or acceptability of a group's message 
should be immune from judicial scrutiny, the relationship be-
tween the excluded person and the common beliefs and interests 
around which a group has formed that must be examined.38 But 
that relationship must be examined if the expressive association 
doctrine is to remain tied to actual group expression. 
This analysis suggests that a group's expression may differ 
from positions its leaders take in litigation. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that organizations that sponsor Scout troops, the boys them-
selves, and the members of Scouting's governing bodies have 
various views on immigration policy. Suppose further that no 
one has ever considered these views relevant to Scouting, and 
that Scoutmasters say nothing whatever to the boys about immi-
gration. 
Finally, suppose Scouting's highest governing body is split 
4-3 between persons favoring tight restrictions on immigration 
and those favoring an open-door policy. The advocates of re-
strictions vote to exclude boys whose parents emigrated from 
"non-Caucasian" countries.39 Scout troops obey the vote. A 
Chinese son of immigrant parents sues a local troop under an 
anti-discrimination law. The Scouts' board votes 4-3 to defend 
on free speech grounds, and the briefs offer that defense. What 
result? 
If and to the extent the expressive association doctrine is an 
instrumental doctrine designed to facilitate actual group expres-
sion, and under the theory of group expression defended above, 
the Scouts would lose. In this example, the members of the 
Scouts-including boys, Scoutmasters, administrators, and spon-
sors-have no common beliefs or interests regarding immigra-
tion. A ruling compelling the admission of the boy in question 
would impair neither the ability of the members to pursue their 
collective purposes nor the expression of the group as a whole. 
38. A similar approach was advocated in an amicus brief filed by Professors David 
Cole and Nan Hunter on behalf of the Society of American Law Teachers. 2000 WL 
339882. 
39. Cf. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that ana· 
tive Hindu of India was not eligible for naturalization under a statute applying to "free 
white persons"). 
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Suppose the expressive association doctrine is not instru-
mental, however. Suppose instead that the doctrine protects 
only the managerial discretion of groups. In that case, all these 
facts would be irrelevant and the Scouts would win. The ques-
tion is which outcome the ruling in Dale implies. 
II. THE COURT'S RULING 
New Jersey's law against discrimination prohibits places of 
public accommodation from discriminating against persons on 
the basis of their sexual orientation.40 After the Boy Scouts ex-
pelled James Dale from the organization because he is openly 
gay, he sued the group under this statute. New Jersey found that 
the Scouts are a place of public accommodation within the 
meaning of its statute. The Court accepted the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's interpretation of this law, as it had to, but seemed 
concerned by this interpretation. The Court said that as the 
public accommodations concept has broadened beyond "places 
where the public is invited" such as "taverns, restaurants, retail 
shops, and public libraries," 41 the "potential for conflict between 
state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment 
rights of organizations has increased. "42 
The Court's point is a fair one, and may explain the often 
terse writing in the opinion. But the point cuts both ways. The 
free speech concept has broadened over time as well. In the 
days of the traditional public accommodations cases, the Cruik-
shank Court could hold that assemblies were not protected in 
general but only when they were for the purpose of petitioning 
the national government.43 This is not to question the expansion 
of free speech protection. The point is only that this expansion 
has been the result of judgments about how speech should be 
protected and why. The expansion of the public accommoda-
tions concept rests on judgments as well. Reconciling the two 
requires a further judgment; it is not a case of one doctrine ex-
panding to distort another that we may take for granted as a 
baseline right. How to resolve this conflict is the question at the 
heart of the expressive association doctrine and of the case. 
40. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. 
41. ld. at 657. 
42. ld. 
43. See text accompanying note 14. 
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The cases before Dale implied that the evidence in the re-
cord was the most important part of the case. The Dale Court 
appeared to agree, saying that "the ultimate conclusions of law" 
in Dale were "virtually inseparable from findings of fact."44 The 
Court also said that compelled association violates the speech 
clause only "if the presence of" the person whose admission is 
compelled "affects in a significant wa~ the group's ability to ad-
vocate public or private viewpoints." 5 To qualify for constitu-
tional protection, "a group must enga?e in some form of expres-
sion, whether it be public or private."4 
The Court did not mean this statement to be taken literally. 
All organizations engage in some form of "private expression," 
including business firms whose purpose is to produce widgets 
rather than speech. Much of the "private expression" in such 
firms is intended and understood as performative: The expres-
sion is a way of getting things done rather than the basis for de-
liberation and discussion. The Court has not and will not extend 
the protection of the speech clause to such "private expression." 
Prior to Dale, the speech clause would not provide a defense to 
a claim under New Jersey's law against discrimination based on 
a memorandum from the head of a business firm ordering a sub-
ordinate not to hire an applicant because the applicant was gay. 47 
Nothing in Dale changes that result. 
Both precedent and the structure of the opinion in Dale 
show that the Court's language distinguishes between groups 
formed for the purpose of expressing and considering ideas and 
groups formed for non-expressive purposes, such as the manu-
facture of bicycles or cars, or the sale of securities. The Dale 
Court began by establishing that the Scouts are an expressive 
group. It did this by looking in a general way at the Scouts' pur-
pose and practices. The Boy Scouts are "a private, nonprofit or-
ganization" whose mission it is '"to instill values in young peo-
ple."'48 Their method is to have adult leaders "spend time with 
the youth members, instructing and engaging them in activities 
44. 530 U.S. at 648. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. This would be true even for a government employer, a case in which the re-
quirement of state action would be satisfied. E.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 
(1994) (discussing differences in protection for performative workplace speech and pro-
tected expression); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (same). 
48. Id. at 649. 
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like camping, archery, and fishing."49 In the course of these ac-
tivities, adult members "inculcate [boys] with the Boy Scouts' 
values-both expressly and by example."50 The Court had no 
trouble finding that "an association that seeks to transmit such a 
system of values engages in expressive activity."51 
What values do the Scouts transmit? The Court accepted 
the Scouts' claim that they try to instill a message of "moral 
straightness" in boys.52 The Scouts did not describe their "mor-
ally straight" message in detail, but they did say it is inconsistent 
with homosexuality. The Court accepted as well the Scouts' fur-
ther claim that allowing openly gay men to become Scoutmasters 
would impair their message. 
"Accepted" in this case is to be taken literally. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was admirably direct in stating that "[t]he Boy Scouts 
asserts that it 'teach[es] that homosexual conduct is not morally 
straight'" and that "[w]e accept the Boy Scouts' assertion. We 
need not inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy 
Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality."53 The Court 
also said that, "[a]s we give deference to an association's asser-
tions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give 
deference to an association's view of what would impair its ex-
. ,54 pressiOn. 
There were four questions in Dale: whether the Scouts were 
an expressive organization; whether they expressed any message 
relating to homosexuality; whether admitting Dale would impair 
their expression; and, if so, whether New Jersey's interests justi-
fied the impairment. The first three questions were factual; the 
fourth was legal. The standard of review was de novo.55 The 
Court decided the first question by looking at the record. It de-
cided the next two by deferring to the assertions in the Scouts' 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 649-50. 
51. Id. at 650. 
52. Id. 
53. 530 U.S. at 651. The Court actually did inquire somewhat further into there-
cord, saying that "because the record before us contains written evidence of the Boy 
Scouts' viewpoint, we look to it as instructive, if only on the question of the sincerity of 
the professed beliefs." I d. The Court's language suggests that it saw this inquiry as op-
tional and not required by the doctrine itself. 
54. Id. at 653. Earlier in the opinion the Court rightly said that to determine 
whether Dale's presence as a Scoutmaster would impair the Scouts' expression the Court 
had to "explore, to a limited extent, the nature of the Boy Scouts' view of homosexual-
ity." I d. at 650. The balance of the opinion did little to satisfy this inquiry, however. 
55. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557 (1995). 
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briefs, with a quick and apparently optional review of the record 
to gauge the sincerity of the Scouts' professed beliefs. 
The only question remaining was whether New Jersey's in-
terests in eliminating discrimination against homosexuals justi-
fied the impairment the Court had found. On this point the 
Court was brief: "The state interests embodied in New Jersey's 
public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion 
on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association."56 
Though the Court said it accepted the Scouts' claim to teach 
boys a message of moral straightness at odds with homosexual-
ity, at times it came close to treating Dale's open homosexuality 
as inherently expressive. Two statements stand out in this re-
gard. The first is the Court's assurance that, while expressive as-
sociations may not "erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws 
simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a 
particular group would impair its message," this case was differ-
ent because Dale was openly gay and a "gay rights activist." 
Thus, his "presence in the Boy Scouts would ... force the or-
ganization to send a message, both to the youth members and 
the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior. "57 
The second statement came in response to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's conclusion that admitting Dale would not im-
pair the Scouts' expression because the Scouts allow heterosex-
ual scoutmasters to disagree with their policies but do not kick 
them out. In the Court's view, this fact was irrelevant because 
"[t)he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist 
in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different 
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmas-
ter who is on record as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy. The 
Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one 
message but not the other. "58 
56. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
57. Id. at 653. 
58. Id. at 655-56. As Andrew Koppelman has noted, the record did not contain 
very much evidence to support the Court's characterization of Dale as an "activist." An· 
drew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the Changing 
Meaning of Nondiscrimination 12 n.8 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
And, as Koppelman also points out, the Scouts excluded Dale for being openly gay not 
for being an activist. Id. To me, this fact makes the Court's language more suggestive. 
The Court knew that the Scouts' policy was to exclude openly gay men. The Court could 
hav~ re~erred only to that policy, but it didn't. Instead, in the portion of the opinion that 
d1stmgmshes Dale from pretextual claims of impairment, which the Court says it would 
not uphold, the Court focuses on Dale's alleged activism as the source of actual impair-
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Should these statements be read as holding that Dale's 
homosexuality was so inherently expressive that admitting him 
to the Scouts would violate the organization's right against com-
pelled expression? No. Most importantly, in both passages the 
Court referred to Dale not only as a gay man, nor as an openly 
gay man, but as a "gay rights activist." This language suggests 
the Court thought the Scouts had a right to protect their message 
from being drowned out or blurred by Dale's "activist" expres-
sion. On this view, the question whether the Scouts would have 
a speech-based right to exclude a gay man who was not an activ-
ist is left unresolved. 
Moreover, reading the Court as holding that Dale's homo-
sexuality was inherently expressive would make large portions of 
the opinion irrelevant. If the Court had adopted such a theory, 
it would not have needed to refer to any teaching by the Scouts, 
nor would it have needed to defer to the Scouts' assertions about 
their teaching or what would impair it. The opinion could sim-
ply have stated that Dale's sexuality was expressive within the 
meaning of the speech clause and accepted the Scouts' claim that 
they did not wish to express his message. Nothing more would 
have been needed. 
And reading Dale to hold that personal characteristics are 
expressive within the meaning of the speech clause would imply 
significant consequences the Court did not consider. Such a 
reading would imply that any expressive group has a right to ex-
clude persons whose personal characteristics even a portion of 
the group dislikes, regardless whether the group expresses any 
message relevant to those characteristics, as a defense against 
being compelled to express approval of those characteristics. 
And to the extent personal characteristics are inherently expres-
sive, such a reading could complicate anti-discrimination policy 
even with respect to groups whose expression was highly instru-
mental, such as business firms or professional networking or-
ganizations. Could any organization meeting the standards of a 
public accommodation exclude Dale on this reading of the case? 
The Rotary? The Jaycees? The ABA? The American Chemi-
cal Association? The Society of Professional Journalists? 
The questions raised by such a reading of the case extend to 
personal characteristics generally, not just homosexuality. Be-
cause the Court made no effort to articulate a theory of expres-
ment in this case. It may be that the Court will always consider even very scanty evi-
dence sufficient to meet the "activism" requirement, but that remains to be seen. 
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sive identity, it did not offer any basis for limiting such a theory 
to sexual orientation. Are we to conclude that race and gender, 
which are at least as observable as sexual orientation, are inher-
ently expressive?59 Would it follow that private organizations 
may exclude women and blacks on the ground that they have a 
right not to be compelled to express approval of them? Is the 
doctrine limited to traits we consider immutable or changeable 
only at great cost? Must elementary schools fire teachers who 
also teach Sunday school- a choice easier to make and thus pre-
sumably more expressive in the conventional sense than race, 
gender, or sexual orientation-on the ground that employing an 
"open" Sunday school teacher would express approval of relig-
ion? 
The question of how far the expressive identity concept 
goes is particularly important because the Court made a point of 
deferring to the Scouts' message and their view of what would 
impair it. If we read Dale as establishing a theory of expressive 
identity then what are we to do with the Court's previous deci-
sions compelling the admission of women to the Rotary60 and the 
Jaycees?61 Both organizations claimed that the admission of 
women would impair their expression; if gender is expressive 
within the meaning of the speech clause, then this point must be 
k . 1 62 ta en senous y. 
59. Race and gender might be considered less expressive precisely because they are 
more readily observable. One could argue that gay men might pass for straight, and a 
declaration of sexual identity would therefore be more expressive than race or gender 
because it is the product of a choice to communicate. The argument is true, but it does 
not follow that declarations of sexual identity amount to protected speech. From the 
speaker's perspective, all forms of communication are produced by choices. Tripping in 
the street is not speaking, but dancing or marching is. That choice is involved may link a 
declaration of sexual identity more directly to autonomy or self-realization interests, but 
these are not useful tools for deciding free speech cases. See note 4. Persons who object 
to open homosexuality probably object to the status or practices of homosexuals rather 
than the statement itself. (Would the Scouts exclude a person who said he was gay but 
whom everyone knew was joking or engaging in satire?) If the status or practices the 
statement implies are considered part of the protected expression, it would be hard to 
extend the expressive identity concept to gays and lesbians but not members of other 
minority groups or to women. Groups such as the Scouts would logically be able to ex-
clude such persons on the ground that exclusion was necessary to avoid communicating a 
message of approval. That gay men might pass for straight and therefore join groups 
who would exclude them if they were open might lessen the degree to which a theory of 
expressive identity works against them. A theory of expressive identity therefore might 
foreclose more opportunities to women and minorities other than homosexuals than it 
would to gays and lesbians. 
60. Bd. of Directors of Rotary lnt'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
61. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
62. Professor Hunter argues that in Roberts Justice Brennan "simply steam-rolled 
the defendant's claims that admission of women would affect the expressive culture of a 
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The Court did not say it was overruling Roberts and Duarte, 
however. Though its deference to the Scouts' assertions was a 
significant departure from its approach in those cases, the Court 
sidestepped this fact and said only that Roberts and Duarte were 
different because "in each of these cases we went on to conclude 
that the enforcement of [state anti-discrimination laws] would 
not materially interfere with the ideas that the organization 
sought to express. "63 Because the Court did not argue that ho-
mosexuality was more expressive than gender, it is hard to say 
that the difference in the cases had to do with the expressiveness 
of personal characteristics. 
The stakes on this point are very high. Social interaction in 
public accommodations rests in large part on statutes that were 
based on the notion that it is exclusion that is expressive, creat-
ing inferior castes and causing psychological harm to members of 
excluded groups. Congress, the Court, and state legislatures, for 
example, have found that segregated businesses or schools ex-
press a variety of messages disparaging blacks and members of 
other minority groups.64 Statutes and decisions forbidding seg-
regation in public accommodations have been designed at least 
previously male-only organization." Hunter, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 21 (cited in 
note 2). 
63. Dale, 530 U.S. at 657. 
64. One could say that commercial enterprises arc different from the Boy Scouts, 
and this is true. They are more places for doing business than for debating or inculcating 
ideas. The point is that if personal characteristics are expressive, and disassociation gets 
constitutional protection as a defense against compelled expression, then either Congress 
no longer has plenary power to regulate disassociation by commercial enterprises or we 
must explain why personal characteristics are expressive in noncommercial contexts but 
not in commercial ones. 
Such distinctions can be made: Customers probably understand that employers hire 
employees to do a job not tout a view, and further understand that hiring is done subject 
to a variety of laws. Customers come to businesses to engage in transactions, not debate 
and deliberate on matters relating to democratic self-governance. Employees are agents 
acting for firms, not on their own behalf. All these factors and more suggest that the 
workplace is, and is understood by all concerned to be, an instrumental setting in which 
considerations of personal expression are subordinate to legal regulation of the transac-
tions in which the firm engages. In such domains, concerns of efficiency and instrumen-
tal reasoning predominate over constitutional expression; in the realm of public dis-
course the reverse is true. Thus we do not see free speech defenses prevailing in garden-
variety contract cases or warranty disputes. E.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S. 
663 (1991). (I here follow the analysis most fully developed in Post, Constitutional Do-
mains (cited in note 4), in particular the Introduction and Chapter Four.) The problem is 
that all these points have always been true, even during the period in which the Court 
and various legislative bodies came to accept the notion of disassociation as the source of 
expressive harms. Did the Court, Congress, and various state .legislatures have this 
backwards the whole time? I am reluctant to read Dale as 1mplymg that they d1d, par-
ticularly when the opinion offers no defense of such a reading. 
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in part to counter such messages.65 To turn such reasoning on its 
head and say that it is inclusion that is expressive, with exclusion 
being a penumbral right powerful enough to trump anti-
discrimination laws, is a major step. Though serious scholars 
have argued that Dale should be read as undermining such stat-
utes,66 the Court provided no analytical basis for taking such a 
step. For these reasons, and because the facts do not require 
such a reading, Dale should not be read as adopting a theory of 
expressive identity as a form of constitutionally protected 
speech. 
B. THE DISSENT 
Justice Stevens dissented.67 He pointed out that the Scouts 
do not actually teach boys that homosexuality is wrong. He 
cited evidence that the Scouts do not wish to send boys any mes-
sage at all about sex, preferring that they learn about such mat-
ters from their parents or religious advisers.68 Other evidence 
showed that the Scouts teach boys tolerance and obedience to 
laws with which they disagree, messages consistent with New 
Jersex's statutory requirement that the Scouts admit openly gay 
men. 9 The Scouts maintain a "don't ask, don't tell" policy re-
65. On the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see, for example, United States v. Baird, 85 
F.3d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Prior to the statute, many establishments generally open 
to the public discriminated against blacks, or Jews, or Indians, or any number of other 
groups, based on their race, color, religion, and national origin. This established public 
badges of inferiority for the excluded groups, marking them as of lower social status"). 
On state laws see Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562,620 (1999) (noting finding 
of New Jersey legislature that discrimination based on sexual orientation inflicts "stigma-
tizing" injury). On the expressive aspects of disassociation generally, see, for example, 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483,494 (1954) ('"the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group"') (quoting finding of fact from three-judge district court in 
Kansas); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1 (1976); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
Yale L.J. 421 (1960). 
66. See Richard A. Epstein, Free Association: The incoherence of antidiscrimination 
laws, National Review (Oct. 19, 2000). Professor Epstein argues: 
[r]ightly understood, Dale forces us to confront the multiple forms of forced 
private association that have been staples of the New Deal and the Great Soci-
ety. For starters, ask whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-which pro-
hibits private employers from discriminating against employees because of race, 
creed, and sex-can survive constitutional challenge under the First Amendment. 
If these firms all have their expressive components, then why can the state force 
them to hire people whom they wish to exclude? Follow Dale, and it is flatly 
unconstitutional for the U.S. to force any private organization to adopt a color-
blind or sex-blind policy in hiring or admission to membership. 
67. Dale, 530 U.S. at 663. 
68. ld. at 669-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
69. ld. at 672-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The reference to obedience for the law 
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garding gays, which is to a degree inconsistent with the claim 
that homosexualitrc violates the requirement that Scouts be 
"morally straight." ° Forced admission of openly gay men, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded, would not interfere with any message 
the Scouts actually express to the boys. 
At times, Justice Stevens bordered on lecturing the Scouts 
about their message rather than making it a subject of inquiry. 
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens had support in the record for the 
claim that, even after litigation gave them an incentive to build a 
record, the Scouts made only weak and inconsistent efforts to 
link the exclusion of openly gay men to their message. Indeed, 
the Scouts' most recent statement on the matter linked exclusion 
of gays to parental expectations as much as free expression: 
"The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected the expecta-
tions that Scouting families have had for the organization. We 
do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent 
with these expectations. "71 
Nor did the Scouts claim that they have decided to start tak-
ing positions on homosexuality. Thus, the Scouts' teaching pre-
sumably will continue to steer clear of sexual issues. They will 
continue to teach tolerance and obedience to the law, presuma-
bly including laws such as New Jersey's anti-discrimination stat-
ute. They will continue not to ask whether prospective Scout-
masters are gay, and they will continue to tolerate gay men who 
are not open about their sexual orientation. 
III. THE SCOUTS' VIEWPOINT(S) 
Having examined a theory of group expression and the 
Court's treatment of the Scouts' claims, we turn to comparing 
the two. Based on the Scouts' briefs, and briefs filed as amici cu-
riae by some of the groups that sponsor Scout troops, the Scouts' 
members express at least three distinct messages regarding ho-
mosexuality, two of which contradict each other. This part ana-
was in the record. The Scouts' Reply Brief suggested that the Scouts teach tolerance for 
others. 
70. At oral argument, the Scouts' counsel stated that the Scouts' "policy is not to 
inquire. The policy is to exclude those who are open." 2000 WL 489419 at *5. See a_lso 
Petitioner's Brief at *6 ("Boy Scouting makes no effort to d1scover the sexual onentat10n 
of any person. Its expressive purpose is not implicated unless a prospective leader pre-
sents himself as a role model inconsistent with Boy Scouting's understanding of the Scout 
Oath and Law"). 2000 WL 228616. 
71. Dale, 530 U.S. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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lyzes those messages and their implications for the Scouts' col-
lective expression. 
First we must briefly examine the structure of the Scouts as 
a group. The Scouts exist as a national entity with a national 
reputation, but their organization is decentralized. The highest 
governing body is the National Council, which is responsible for 
developing programs and establishing general policies. Scouting 
programs are also governed by regional committees, beneath 
which sit area committees. Within each area, the Scouts accept 
applications for the creation of local councils, of which there are 
over 400 nationwide. Each local council is in turn made up of 
districts, for which district committees are responsible. Troops 
are formed within districts. 72 
The messages of Scouting are expressed locally. As the 
Scouts' brief put it, 
Boy Scouting takes place primarily in Troops, small units 
typically consisting of 15 to 30 boys led by a uniformed 
Scoutmaster and Assistant Scoutmasters. Almost 65 percent 
of Boy Scout Troops are sponsored by churches or syna-
gogues, more than 25 percent are chartered to private com-
munity organizations, and fewer than 10 percent are char-
tered to public institutions. Boy Scouting is an integral part of 
many church youth programs. Responsibility for inculcating 
Boy Scouting's values is entrusted to the volunteer Scoutmas-
ter and Assistant Scoutmasters.73 
Appointment of a Scoutmaster is subject to the approval of the 
sponsor of the particular troop, the local council that oversees 
scouting in a particular region, and the Boy Scouts of America 
itself.74 
The Scouts' opening brief acknowledges that they do not in-
struct boys on matters of sex or homosexuality. The brief in-
stead argues that their silence on homosexuality and sex in gen-
eral does not imply approval of or even tolerance for 
homosexuality. If anything, quiet condemnation is implied: 
Official Scouting materials addressed to the boys do not refer 
to homosexuality or inveigh against homosexual conduct; 
72. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 572 (1999). Every organization 
that sponsers a troop has a delegate to its local council. Every local council has three or 
more delegates to the National Executive Board. Petitioner's Reply Brief, 2000 WL 
432367 at *7 p. 8. 
73. 2000 WL 228616 at *3. 
74. Id. at *4. 
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rather, they teach family-oriented values and tolerance of all 
persons. In keeping with the view that boys learn best by 
positive example, rather than by "thou shalt nots," the hand-
books for boys do not catalog immoral behavior for Boy 
Scouts. It cannot be inferred that unmentioned misconduct is 
consistent with Scouting's moral code.75 
As the opinion suggests,76 and as stated in the sponsors' 
briefs we will examine in a moment, some heterosexual Scout-
masters apparently depart from this policy and teach either that 
homosexuality is consistent with moral straightness or that it is 
not, apparently without sanction by the Scouts.n Why would the 
Scouts claim as an official matter that they do not address homo-
sexuality but allow straight Scoutmasters to deviate from this 
policy? 
One possible answer is that the Scouts exclude gays to send 
a message to parents about the safety of Scouting rather than to 
teach boys as part of the message conveyed through Scouting. 
The opinions presumed that the audience for the Scouts' mes-
sage is the boys. This presumption is understandable, for that is 
how the parties presented the case. But parents decide whether 
75. ld. at *5. 
76. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
77. In their Reply brief, the Scouts argued that Scoutmasters who taught that ho-
mosexuality was consistent with moral straightness would be "subject to revocation of 
their registration" and referred to testimony from a Scout executive in Dale's region that 
persons teaching that homosexuality is morally straight would have their membership 
revoked. The brief also pointed to a person whose registration was apparently revoked 
because he taught that homosexuality was morally straight. 2000 WL 432367 at *8. This 
person had submitted an affidavit in support of Dale, however. The parties may have 
been using his case to make a point about their litigation positions. His dismissal there-
fore may or may not reflect general practice. The Scouts' counsel was asked at oral ar-
gument whether the Scouts would exclude a heterosexual Scoutmaster who, like Dale, 
advocated a position of gay equality outside the context of Scouting. He responded that 
he had "no information as to how that situation would be resolved." 2000 WL 489419 at 
*12. Neither in their Reply papers nor at oral argument did the Scouts address the claim 
made in the amicus brief for Dale, which is quoted in the text accompanying note 88. 
The Court's opinion noted that there was conflicting evidence on this point, 530 U.S. at 
655-56 n.l. This point actually does not matter much to the overall analysis, however. 
The Scouts did not dispute the claim that some troops are actually taught that homo-
sexuality is not morally straight, leaving that teaching as a costless option for persons 
who actually hold such beliefs. If the Scouts do expel persons who teach that homosexu-
ality is morally straight, the risk of expulsion would make persons more likely to follow 
the Scouts' stated policy, and therefore produce greater silence on the particular issue of 
homosexuality, regardless of the personal views of Scoutmasters and sponsors. To the 
extent such a policy would do anything, it would understate the degree to which sponsors 
accept homosexuality. 
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boys become and remain Scouts. The Boy Scouts will have no 
boys if parents reject scouting.78 
A conjecture: The Scouts believe that parents fear gay 
Scoutmasters will make sexual advances towards their sons.79 To 
reassure parents, the Scouts exclude openly gay Scoutmasters. 
Exclusion sends a message to the parents-no gay scoutmaster 
will make sexual advances toward your son-even if the Scouts 
do not teach the boys anything on sexual matters. Perhaps this is 
what the Scouts meant by saying that their policy reflects paren-
tal expectations.80 Once parental fears of sexual activity are 
calmed, actual indoctrination of the boys is unnecessary.81 
78. Various forms of parental permission are necessary for a boy to join the Scouts. 
Petitioner's Brief at *10. 
79. At argument, the Scouts' counsel denied that fear of homosexual predation 
plays any role in their exclusion of gay Scoutmasters: 
QUESTION: ... I understand that the Scouts' position on this does not in 
any way depend on a judgment that Mr. Dale is-presents or would present an 
undue risk of homosexual conduct with the Scouts in his troop, is that correct? 
It's not a fear of conduct? 
MR. DAVIDSON: Absolutely not, Your Honor. In fact, the issue of possi-
ble sexual abuse is one that's very important to Scouts. Every Scout handbook 
and Scout master [sic] handbook comes with an insert, which is in the record at 
2248 which talks about sexual abuse at some length. It never mentions the word 
homosexual. In fact, the only thing it says about gender is that there's a rising 
incidence of abuse by female adults. 
2000 WL 489419 at *9-*10. The Scouts' counsel referred to documents distributed to 
Scoutmasters and boys, though not to the assurances given to parents on the general is-
sue of abuse. To say that the Scouts are worried about molestation in general (by 
whom?), or molestation by adult women, but not advances by male Scoutmasters in par-
ticular, is not a very credible position. There is nothing wrong with the Scouts' concern 
over sexual advances towards boys. To the contrary, one would expect any organization 
in charge of young boys to be concerned with all aspects of their welfare. My only point 
is that the Scouts' policy may have been designed to send a message of reassurance to 
parents. 
80. Justice Breyer tried but failed to get an answer on this point at oral argument: 
QUESTION: My basic question is, how do I know, how arc we supposed 
to find out whether the policy reflects very great concern about the conduct, or 
reflects very great concern about public reaction? That was my question, and 
how do we decide the mix of that? 
MR. DAVIDSON: Well, I'm not sure as a matter of First Amendment law 
that one might decide for public reaction reasons to have a certain policy. I'm 
not sure of the legal relevance of that distinction .... 
MR. DAVIDSON: There's been no evidence that would raise any question 
of fact on that issue. There's been no question that the statements, the position 
statements aren't authentic and weren't issued by who they said they were is-
sued by. There's simply no basis for any such conclusion. 
2000 WL 489419 at *17-*18. 
81. There may be a temporal explanation as well. Perhaps the Scouts have not 
been concerned about openly gay men in the past because gay men historically have not 
been open about their sexual orientation. (My thanks to Bill Eskridge for this sugges-
tion.) Limiting their prohibition to only openly gay men might be a response to that de-
velopment, though one still wonders why openly gay men offend the Scouts' teaching of 
moral straightness, or the Scouts' efforts to personify their teachings, while gay men per 
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This conjecture rests in part on an assumption: There is a 
group of parents and sponsors associated with Scouting who 
maintain various views about homosexuality but who believe 
common sense dictates that gay men should not be placed in 
charge of boys. I will refer to members of this group collectively 
as Group One. What evidence is there that such a group exists? 
One clue is that, without using the word "homosexual," Scouting 
literature tries to reassure parents that the risk of sexual abuse is 
low. For example, Scouting literature assures parents that "one-
on-one activities between youth members and adults are not 
permitted;gersonal conferences must be conducted in plain view 
of others." 
And consider an analogy drawn by one Scoutmaster after 
the decision: "how many parents would allow their high school 
daughters to go backpacking in the mountains, swimming in wil-
derness rivers, chaperoned by several college men?"83 As he saw 
it, "[c]hances are, nothing will go wrong on any given trip, but as 
parents, you do not want to run that risk. The institutional lead-
ers are even more hesitant, needing to keep the program above 
all suspicion." Thus, "if the choice is between accommodating 
se do not. An alternative conjecture, which also views the parents as at least part of the 
relevant audience, is that the Scouts exclude openly gay men because they do not want to 
be perceived as "promoting" homosexuality. For more on the promotion notion, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and 
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1327, 1356 (2001). 
82. A document filed with the Scouts' brief, entitled "Boy Scouts of America 
Information for Parents," states that: 
• Except for daytime patrol activities where adults are not required, two regis-
tered adult leaders or one registered adult leader and a parent of a partici-
pant, one of whom must be 21 years of age or older, are required on all trips 
and outings. If activities are coeducational, leaders of both sexes must be 
present. ... 
• One-on-one activities between youth members and adults are not permitted; 
personal conferences must be conducted in plain view of others. 
• If you suspect that anyone in the unit is a victim of child abuse, immediately 
contact the Scout executive, who is responsible for reporting this to the ap-
propriate authorities. 
2000 WL 228616 at *3a-*4a. 
A document posted on the Scouts' website entitled Guide to Safe Scouting fur-
ther states that "adult leaders must respect the privacy of youth members in situations 
such as changing clothes and taking showers at camp, and intrude only to the extent that 
health and safety require. Adults must protect their own privacy in similar situations." 
The guide also states that "[w]hen camping, no youth is permitted to sleep in the tent of 
an adult other than his parent or guardian" and that "[p]roper clothing for all activities is 
required. For example, skinny-dipping is not appropriate as part of Scouting." Guide to 
Safe Scouting: Youth Protection and Adult Leadership (available at <www.scouting. 
org!pubslgss/gssOl.html>) (last visited June 29, 2001) (copy on file with author). 
83. Frank Laney, The Troubling Issue is Sexual Attraction, Raleigh News Observer 
(Sept. 8, 2000). 
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gay men and keeping Scout trips comfortable for parents so that 
boys can participate, the choice will be for boy participation. "84 
Having conjectured that such a group exists, consider the 
question posed by the Scouts' opening brief: What may we infer 
about the attitudes of this group from a policy of teaching boys 
to be "morally straight," saying nothing about homosexuality, 
and excluding openly gay men as Scoutmasters? Nothing. Par-
ents or troop sponsors who believe that gay men should be ex-
cluded from Scouting as a precaution against sexual activity 
would favor expelling Dale regardless of what they believed 
about the morality of homosexuality in general. 
As noted above, scoutmasters or troop sponsors who wish 
to teach explicitly that homosexuality is wrong apparently may 
do so without restriction by the national organization.85 In light 
of this fact, one might draw a weak inference that Scoutmasters 
and troops who do not teach that homosexuality is wrong have 
no objection to it as a general matter, objecting only that gay 
men should not be Scoutmasters. But there are too many other 
explanations to warrant such an inference. Local troops might 
not oppose homosexuality strongly enough to want to make a 
point of their opposition, or they might believe the Scouts are 
the wrong place to make such a point. Either way, we cannot 
reason backwards from the stated policy to deduce general atti-
tudes on homosexuality within Group One. 
In addition to the message the Scouts defended before the 
Court, troop sponsors and Scoutmasters apparently may offer 
either of two unofficial messages, which contradict each other. 
As noted above, a majority of troops are sponsored by one of a 
large number of religious organizations.86 Some religions con-
demn homosexuality and would not tolerate gay Scoutmasters. 
84. ld. 
85. See text accompanying note 89. 
86. A majority of troops are sponsored by religious organizations, but not a major-
ity of boys. There are four million boys in Scouting; the briefs of amici religious sponsors 
claim to account for only about 1.3 million. Presumably troops sponsored by non-
religious organizations are larger than those sponsored by religious organizations, which 
would be consistent with the claim of at least some religious organizations to use Scout-
ing as an extension of their youth ministries. Dale's brief provides examples of non-
religious sponsors in New Jersey, which include "over 600 government agencies or or-
ganizations operating under state aegis, including 15 city governments, 92 law enforce-
ment agencies, 191 public schools, 281 school parent-teacher associations and groups, 21 
boards of education, 6 Army National Guard units, 4 Navy units, 1 Coast Guard unit, 2 
Disabled Veterans units, 3 Air Force units, 10 Army units, and 132 fire departments." 
2000 WL 340276 at *2. 
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Others disagree.87 Actually teaching the boys anything about 
homosexuality, one way or the other, could create or worsen 
conflict among religious sponsors. A second conjecture: The 
Scouts avoid such conflict by remaining silent on sexual matters 
and excluding the most easily identifiable gay men-those who 
are openly gay. 
What support is there for this conjecture? Consider the 
briefs of two sets of amici who sponsor Scout troops. The first, 
filed by a group of sponsors including the United Methodist 
Church, said that 
... we have no First Amendment problem in this case .... our 
boys and young men do not participate in the Boy Scouts for 
the purpose of expressing the view that gay boys and men are 
immoral. We believe that it is discrimination against gay peo-
ple that is immoral, a belief that we teach our boys in Scout-
ing and that BSA has never told us not to teach.88 
I will call this group of sponsors, who wish to teach boys that dis-
crimination against gays is immoral, Group Two. Members of 
this group would probably disagree with Group One members 
on excluding gays; the two groups might or might not agree on 
teaching the boys to tolerate gays and homosexuality in general. 
The second brief, filed by a group of sponsors including the 
Catholic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, and a Scouting organization within the United Methodist 
Church, stated that 
87. Dale, 160 N.J. at 615 ("the record in this case reveals that Boy Scouts' religious 
sponsors differ in their views about homosexuality"). The Court received an amicus 
brief supporting the Scouts filed by the National Catholic Committee on Scouting, the 
General Commission on United Methodist Men of the United Methodist Church, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and 
the National Council of Young Israel. 2000 WL 235234. Supporting Dale was an amicus 
brief filed by The General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist 
Church, the United Church Board for Homeland Ministries, the Religious Action Center 
of Reform Judaism, the Diocesan Council of the Episcopal Diocese of Newark, and the 
Unitarian Universalist Association. 2000 WL 339878. 
88. 2000 WL 339878 at *6. This brief argued that the Scouts' expulsion of Dale con-
tradicted their claim to be defending religious expression because Dale's troop was spon-
sored by the United Methodist Church: 
... James Dale's Boy Scout troop-Troop 73-was sponsored by The United 
Methodist Church and met in a hall provided by the Matawan First United 
Methodist Church. The Boy Scouts' rhetoric about protecting religious liberty 
is just that. It was the Boy Scouts' nationalle_adership-in opposition to the re-
ligious doctrines of James Dale's Methodist troop sponsor-that expelled 
James Dale from membership in his United Methodist Church troop. 
Id. at *12. 
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Scouting views homosexual conduct as inconsistent with its 
fundamental moral code. This position is consistent with the 
broader religious teachings about sexuality espoused by 
Scouting's major religious sponsors. Amici ... believe and 
teach that extra-marital sex is sinful, and that one who en-
gages therein is not qualified to lead impressionable youth. 
Amici's view of extra-marital sexual relations remains the 
same whether the specific sexual acts are homosexual or het-
erosexual.89 
151 
These sponsors disagree with the Scouts' stated policy of 
tolerating closeted gays, and would exclude even heterosexual 
Scoutmasters who had extramarital sexual relations.90 Not sur-
prisingly, these sponsors appear to view the Scouts as a fairly di-
rect extension of their ministries and the tenets of their particu-
lar denominations.91 I will call this group of sponsors Group 
89. 2000 WL 235234 at *15-*16. 
90. Id. at *24 n.12 ("It is no response that someone (unlike Dale) might be able to 
conceal his homosexual conduct, or that some other person might be able to hide his ex-
tra-marital affairs. The Scouting Movement cannot survive, much less accomplish, its 
mission, if its leaders live a double standard. Hypocrisy is lethal to character education"). 
In their Reply brief the Scouts cited this amicus brief to support their contention that 
Dale would in fact contradict the Scouts' teaching. 2000 WL 432367 at *6. The Scouts 
did not mention that these amici also apparently do not teach the message the Scouts 
defended before the Court. 
91. There is a possible ambiguity in the statement in this brief, which says that the 
amici teach that homosexuality is morally wrong but does not specifically state that they 
teach their Scout troops that homosexuality is morally wrong. The brief may fairly be 
read as saying that the Scout troops get this message, however. It later says that the fam-
ily values message the amici teach is "at times ... taught expressly in the Scouting con-
text, as when boys directly pose questions about sex to their scoutmasters," though the 
message is most often taught by example. 2000 WL 235234 at *24. 
The brief elsewhere says that "amici have employed Scouting as a tool of religious 
ministry, making Scouting an integral part of their youth programs." Id. at *1. "In many 
of amici's troops, opening and closing prayers are offered to remind the boys of God's 
watchful presence and the seriousness of their religious obligations." Id. at *18. The 
brief also makes clear that these sponsors select Scoutmasters 
[a]ccording to BSA standards and their own religiously informed criteria. For 
many religious organizations, and especially these amici, the Scouting program 
is a means of youth ministry. By selecting adult leaders who uphold and exem-
plify Scouting's ideals, BSA and its sponsors ensure that the message of Scout-
ing is properly taught and modeled to impressionable boys. 
Id. at *3. As the portion of the brief quoted in the text makes clear, these sponsors im-
pose requirements on their troops that are stricter than those the national organization 
defended before the Court. For an example of how these sponsors incorporate Scouting 
into their ministries, see id. at *22: 
Amicus The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints uses Scouting as part of 
the activity program of its "Aaronic Priesthood," the lay priesthood held by all 
young men in the Church. Thus, although the Church welcomes nonmembers as 
full participants in its Scouting units, Scouting serves an important religious 
purpose. Scouting, including Cub Scouting, is an integral part of the priesthood 
training of LDS boys. The bishop of a Church congregation directly overseas 
Scouting, personally selecting (and releasing) the congregation's scout leaders 
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Three. They disagree with Group Two members across the 
board, but can agree with Group One members on the exclusion 
of gays. 
Graphically, my conjectures suggest a continuum of views 
on homosexuality within the Scouts as follows. Favored policies 
on admission of gay Scoutmasters are in the first row, above the 
bold line, and general attitudes on homosexuality are in the sec-
ond row. The policies favored by Groups Two and Three imply 
a specific attitude about homosexuality in general; the policies 
favored by Group One do not. 
Admit Gays/ Exclude Gays/ Exclude Gays/ Teach Teach 
Homosexuality Say Nothing About Homosexuality 
Acceptable Homosexuality Wrong 
Unsure, Unacceptable, 
Homosexuality Acceptable, but not but need not Homosexuality but not in m Acceptable Scouting Scout- be part of wrong 
ing message 
Group Two Group One Group Three 
Table One 
To capture the managerial problems this distribution of 
views presents, we must consider the strength with which mem-
bers of each group hold these views. Assume that Group Two 
members feel strongly about teaching tolerance rather than con-
demnation. There is no question that Group Three members 
feel the opposite. The submission of some Group Three mem-
bers stated that: 
If the appointment of scout leaders cannot be limited to those 
who live and affirm the sexual standards of BSA and its reli-
gious sponsors, the Scouting Movement as now constituted 
will cease to exist. Amicus The Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints-the largest single sponsor of Scouting units in 
the United States-would withdraw from Scouting if it were 
92 
compelled to accept openly homosexual scout leaders. 
in conformity with Church canons and his understanding of God's will. Only 
those who live in harmony with the teachings of the Church and Scoutmg arc 
asked to serve as scout leaders. To provide divine approval to their Scouting 
ministries, senior priesthood officers typically "set apart" new scout leaders by 
the laying on of hands. Cf. Psalms 4:3 (King James): Acts 6:6 (King James). 
92. !d. at *25. 
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Taking the strength of preferences into account, the distribution 
of views implies the following policy choices. 
Teach Teach Teach Teach Accep- Accep- Nothing/ Nothing/ Teach Against 
tance/ tance/ 
Retain Exclude Homosexuality/ Retain Exclude Dale Dale Exclude Dale Dale Dale 
Group Oppose Might Oppose Might Might One Favor Favor Favor 
Group Favor Might Might Oppose Strongly Two Favor Favor Oppose 
Group Strongly Strongly Strongly Might Favor Three Oppose Oppose Oppose Favor 
Table Two 
Given that we have at least three groups and five policy 
choices, one might at first suspect that the Scouts would engage 
in endless cycling.93 That would not occur with this hypothetical 
distribution, however, because column four-exclude and teach 
nothing-is the dominant choice.94 At least one group strongly 
93. E.g., Daniel A. Farber and PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 38-39 (U. 
of Chicago Press, 1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. 
Rev. 802 (1985). There is of course a sixth option-teach against homosexuality andre-
tain Dale- but it makes no sense in the context of the Boy Scouts and I do not consider 
it here. 
94. It is a Condorcet winner, in other words. For a description of the concept, see, 
for example, Maxwell L. Steams, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright 
in Social Choice Perspective, 7 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87 (1999). Some Group Three members 
might accept a teaching that homosexuality was immoral but that one should embrace 
homosexuals and try to "save" them. The amici briefs from which I draw these distribu-
tions do not discuss that approach, however. Group Two members would probably 
strongly oppose such a policy. I list Group Two members as possibly favoring column 
two because they would at least be able to teach their message, but it is equally likely 
that Group Two members would oppose the policy as hypocritical. Because the briefs 
imply that Group Three members actually express condemnation of homosexuality, I list 
that group as taking a "might favor" position on column four, which is the Scouts' litiga-
tion position, even though Group Three supported the Scouts in the litigation. Because 
we do not know the attitudes of Group One members about homosexuality in general, I 
list that group as taking a "might favor" position on each option in which Dale is ex-
cluded. 
I also assume that Group Two members would only oppose a policy of teaching 
nothing while excluding Dale, rather than strongly opposing it. I assume this because 
such a policy at least does not contradict the message Group Two favors, though it does 
contradict the membership policy Group Two favors. Unlike some Group Three mem-
bers, Group Two members did not threaten to leave Scouting if the Court ruled against 
their position. If Group Two members strongly oppose this option, then every policy 
faces strong opposition from at least one group, and there is no longer a logically domi-
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opposes every other option, which makes the members of those 
groups more likely to break with the Scouts over those choices. 
Groups One and Three both wish to exclude Dale, which effec-
tively eliminates the first and third columns. 
Group Three, which felt Dale's presence would express a 
message it opposed, could not accept teaching acceptance of 
homosexuality regardless whether Dale was excluded. The stra-
tegic choice is therefore between saying nothing and excluding 
Dale or teaching that homosexuality is wrong and excluding 
Dale. Group Two cannot get what it wants. The fifth column 
requires teachings that contradict Group Two's beliefs, however, 
while the fourth column does not.95 
If the submissions of these amici may be taken at face value, 
homosexuality threatened to fragment the Scouts as an organiza-
tion precisely because Scouting's sponsors do not agree on what 
message to send on the subject. Against this background, one 
can perhaps understand an aspect of the Scouts' argument that 
might otherwise seem very odd. 
The Scouts' briefs portrayed themselves as practicing be-
nign neutrality in the culture wars: "Boy Scouting attempts to 
walk the line between tolerance toward all people and disap-
proval of some types of conduct."96 Bearing witness to the rhe-
torical force of appeals based on claims of victimization, the 
Scouts claimed to be victims of efforts to depict them as extrem-
ists: "The claim that Boy Scouting can have no protected posi-
tion other than one of explicit hostility is an effort to disqualify 
the middle position of the political spectrum so that all remain-
ing opponents can be dismissed as extremists. "97 From reading 
the briefs, however, one might infer that the Scouts had as many 
worries from internal disagreements on the issue as from social 
condemnation. 
nant option. The choice of policy in that case probably would tum on the relative size of 
the different groups measured by whatever benchmark was most important to the 
Scouts' administrators-i.e., number of troops sponsored, number of boys in troops 
sponsored, etc. 
95. Column four is the best choice for the Scouts regardless of what Group One 
members think about homosexuality outside the context of Scouting. Even if all Group 
One members believe that homosexuality is moral and acceptable in general, but that the 
risk of sexual activity counsels against making gay men Scoutmasters, the Scouts as a 
whole will still choose column four, which avoids antagonizing Group Three. We saw 
earlier that the Scouts' policy of silence on homosexuality tells us nothing about what 
Group One members think about homosexuality in general. That this policy is the 
dominant choice on this assumed distribution of groups reinforces that conclusion. 
96. Petitioner's Reply Brief, 2000 WL 432367 at *5. 
97. !d. 
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IV. ASSESSING THE SCOUTS' EXPRESSION 
Having established in Part I that the expression of groups 
rests on the beliefs and interests their members hold in common, 
and having conjectured in Part III that the Scouts include within 
their ranks three groups with differing beliefs and preferences, I 
turn to the question of ascertaining what the Scouts' collective 
message is. 
The first problem is how to measure the message of the 
Scouts as a whole. Groups Two and Three claim to express mes-
sages about homosexuality to the boys in the Scout troops they 
sponsor. I will assume that they do. I also assume that troops 
sponsored by Group One members receive the message the 
Scouts defended before the Court: instruction to be morally 
straight without specific mention of homosexuality. For the 
moment, I assume that each group is evenly represented in the 
Scouts. If we consider the message taught to the boys as the 
relevant message, then the Scouts' teachings look like this: 
Teach Homosexwlity .Acceptalje 
Teach Homosexwlity Wrong 
Teach Nothing (Morally Straight) 
Figure One 
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On these assumptions, what message do the Scouts express 
about homosexuality? The answer will of course depend on how 
the message is measured. Four possibilities come readily to 
mind. The first is to try to measure the proportion of the group 
that expresses a message, the second is to measure the propor-
tion of the group that agrees with the message, the third is to ac-
cept the message defended by the group's lawyers, and the 
fourth is to try to measure audience perception. 
Predominant Message. 
On the first approach, if we measure the message of the 
group as a whole by the probability that a boy will receive it, and 
if we assume that boys are randomly distributed among the three 
groups, the answer of course is that a boy has a 113 chance of re-
ceiving each message. The Scouts express each message equally. 
Two of them contradict each other, however, and the third 
represents silence on the question of homosexuality. Under 
those conditions, what is the group's message? Are all these 
messages the group's "expression" on homosexuality? Or do 
they cancel each other out, so that the group-as a group apart 
from its members-has no message on homosexuality? The the-
ory of group expression in Part I implies the latter conclusion. 
This illustration poses a problem for the message the Court 
took at face value in Dale. The Scouts told the Court that they 
say nothing about homosexuality in particular, but teach only 
that boys should be "morally straight." On these assumptions, 
however, divisions among the local groups that actually do the 
teaching suggest that 2/3 of boy scouts do not receive the pure 
"morally straight" message. How could the Scouts' litigation po-
sition be considered to be the group's expression if 2/3 of the 
boys are taught something else? 
Acceptance by Members. 
This is where the second approach becomes relevant. Even 
if 2/3 of the boys are actually taught something other than the 
message the Scouts defended in court, assume that either or both 
of Group Two and Group Three members (who teach their 
troops something about homosexuality) are willing to agree that 
Group One members can remain silent on homosexuality in 
their troops. If that is the case, then sponsors representing 2/3 of 
the boys can agree that silence is an acceptable message, even 
though only 113 of the boys actually experience silence while 2/3 
of the boys experience some form of affirmative instruction, split 
evenly between opposing messages. While relevant, the second 
2001] MAKING SENSE OF DALE 157 
approach does not help much to identify a message expressed by 
the Scouts as a group. 
Litigation Position. 
The third approach is simple. The Scouts' lawyers say that 
the group's message is "moral straightness" which, though not 
mentioning homosexuality, is opposed to it. Accepting this ap-
proach solves our measurement problems, and it allows the 
Scouts to play the dominant strategy in the array of options we 
saw in Table Two. 
The main drawback to this approach is that it is a fiction. 
Two-thirds of the boys are taught a message other than the one 
the Court accepts. Of these, 113 are taught a message fully con-
sistent with Dale's presence in the Scouts; the other 113 are 
taught a message flatly inconsistent with Dale's presence in the 
Scouts. Perhaps there is a reason to accept this fiction, but ac-
ceptance requires some justification other than the protection of 
a message actually expressed. 
Adopting this fiction implies freestanding constitutional 
protection of the discretion of at least expressive groups to man-
age their affairs. As we saw with the example of the Scouts and 
immigration restrictions, using the doctrine to protect manage-
rial discretion would be inconsistent with the theory of group 
expression set out in Part I and with the notion of expressive as-
sociation as an instrumental doctrine designed to protect mes-
sages actually expressed. Such an approach would also be in-
consistent with the Court's statement that anti-discrimination 
laws cannot be defeated by assertions that mere association 
would impair a group's expression. I return to these points in 
Part V. 
Audience Perception. 
Finally, the Court could try to measure audience perception 
directly, through such things as survey evidence. That would be 
a bad idea. It would be very costly and run the risk of denying 
protection to messages that are expressed but which are misun-
derstood. Anyone who has seen survey data on how audiences 
perceive messages98 will be reluctant to base such a decision on 
survey research. 
What happens if we relax the assumption that the messages 
are taught in equal proportion? Conflicts among the sponsors, 
98. As in survey evidence that tries to measure confusion in trademark disputes. 
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and within a single large sponsor, make it hard to measure what 
boys are actually taught. We can use some rough numbers for 
illustrative purposes, however. Dale's brief said that, at the be-
ginning of the case, the Scouts had around four million boy 
members and one million adult members.99 Churches claiming to 
sponsor troops with around 500,000 boys and men joined the 
brief from which I have drawn Group Two's position. The 
churches who joined the brief from which I have drawn Group 
Three's position claimed to sponsor troops with around 1.2 mil-
lion boys, but they claimed 424,000 of the boys in Group Two. 100 
If we accept that claim, and assume that all other boys are taught 
nothing about homosexuality, then the Scouts' message looks 
approximately like this. 
99. 2000 WL 340276 at *1. 
100. The brief from which I have drawn the position I ascribe to Group Two based 
its numbers largely on the participation of the General Board and Society of the United 
Methodist Church, which said that that Church sponsors over 12,000 troops with over 
424,000 boys and men. 2000 WL 339878 at *2. Churches claiming to sponsor troops in-
cluding 1.2 million boys joined the brief from which I have drawn the position I ascribe 
to Group Three. 2000 WL 235234 at *1. The General Commission on United Methodist 
Men of the United Methodist Church, a group that said it was responsible for overseeing 
the Church's Scouting activities, joined this brief. It was on that basis that the brief in-
cluded the approximately 424,000 boys in troops sponsored by the United Methodist 
Church. (This brief referred to 424,000 boys, rather than 424,000 boys and men; I assume 
that the 424,000 figure refers to boys and not both boys and men.) The numbers in the 
briefs do not claim to be precise, and the language of each brief aims to give the impres-
sion that the group in question sponsors many boys ("over 424,000," for example). For 
simplicity in the following discussion, I round Group Two's claimed numbers up to 
500,000, Group Three's claimed numbers up to 1.2 million, and the United Methodist 
Church numbers down to 400,000. Because both groups claim the boys in troops spon-
sored by the United Methodist Church, the total number of boys in both groups is only 
about 1.3 million. That leaves about 2.7 million boys who I assume receive the message 
defended before the Court. I do not claim that these numbers are definitive. My analysis 
is meant only to illustrate the difficulty in analyzing the expression boys actually receive. 
2001] MAKING SENSE OF DALE 159 
I Teach Ndting (Morally Straiglt} I 
I Homosexual~y Wrong I 
Figure Two 
This array of teaching at first seems more congenial to the 
Scouts' claims. Slightly over 2/3 of the boys actually receive the 
message the Scouts defended in Court, which means they are 
taught nothing in particular on homosexuality. About 30% of 
the boys are actually taught that homosexuality is wrong. Only 
about 2.5% of the boys are taught that homosexuality is accept-
able and discrimination against homosexuals is immoral. Even if 
we shift the boys in troops sponsored by the United Methodist 
Church into Group Two, we still have slightly over 2/3 of the 
boys being taught nothing about homosexuality, with about 20% 
being taught that homosexuality is wrong and only about 12.5% 
being taught that homosexuality is acceptable. 
If 2/3 of the boys actually are not taught anything about 
homosexuality, then the free speech argument rests on the no-
tion that admitting Dale amounts to compelling the Scouts to 
express a message with which they disagree, or that admitting 
Dale distorts an understanding of "morally straight" that mem-
bers of the Scouts share to a significant degree. The premise of 
this argument is, of course, that a significant proportion of the 
Scouts' members actually believe that homosexuality is unac-
ceptable. 
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But we do not know what the Scouts' members actually 
think on this question. Given the policy options available to the 
three groups within the Scouts, a policy of silence plus exclusion 
is the dominant choice regardless what Group One members 
think about the morality of homosexuality in general. It is at 
least possible for Group One members to believe that (i) gay 
men should not be Scoutmasters because of the risk of sexual 
conduct with the boys; (ii) there is nothing wrong with homo-
sexuality in general; and (iii) that discrimination against homo-
sexuals is, in general though not in Scouting, wrong. To say that 
college men should not chaperone teenage girls is not to con-
demn college men as such, but only to suggest that it is common 
sense to keep them out of a particular situation. Similarly, 
Group One members might, or might not, be happy to associate 
with homosexuals in churches or other associations. 
The Scouts as a whole therefore might want to exclude Dale 
even if a large majority of their members do not think that ho-
mosexuality is morally wrong. On the distribution in Figure 
One, sponsors of troops accounting for 2/3 of the boys might be-
lieve that homosexuality is acceptable in general but is too risky 
in Scouting. On the distribution in Figure Two, which at first 
seems a stronger case for the Scouts, the percentage is even 
higher because the proportion of boys in troops sponsored by 
groups who believe and teach that homosexuality is wrong is 
slightly lower. Probably fewer than seventy percent of the per-
sons involved in Scouting hold neutral or favorable views about 
homosexuality in general. But we cannot draw conclusions on 
this point from the policy the Scouts adopted. We simply do not 
know. 
V. IDENTIFYING THE PROTECTED INTEREST 
Disagreements among Scouting's sponsors might explain 
why the opinion in Dale quietly reworks the characterization of 
group expression in Roberts. 101 Such disagreements also might 
explain the Court's deference to the Scouts' assertions that the 
group expresses a message relevant to homosexuality and that 
Dale would impair that message. Perhaps the Chief Justice saw 
that any inquiry into the Scouts' common beliefs regarding ho-
mosexuality would reveal sharply conflicting claims and contra-
dictory evidence. To reach a conclusion on such a record might 
101. See text accompanying note 34. 
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appear to be taking sides in an internal debate. One can easily 
understand why the Court would not want to appear to be pro-
claiming a victor as among sponsors who endorse competing vi-
sions of the Scouts' message. The job of a judge is to apply the 
Constitution as law, not to pick winners and losers in power 
struggles within a group. 
And the Scouts seemed to have resolved these conflicts 
themselves, at least for purposes of the litigation. The message 
they defended in litigation might be read as a careful compro-
mise. Sponsors who believe homosexuality is wrong got at least 
Dale's expulsion and the Scouts' defense of that expulsion be-
fore the Court. Sponsors who opposed expulsion and would 
teach that discrimination is wrong got at least the acceptance of 
closeted gays and a statement of the Scouts' message that did not 
explicitly condemn gays. The Scouts managed to craft a message 
to defend in litigation; why question it when doing so would in-
volve the Court so deeply in the Scouts' affairs? Why not say in-
stead that "the Boy Scouts takes an official position with respect 
to homosexual conduct, and that is sufficient for First Amend-
ment purposes."102 
Whether the Court's deference was appropriate depends on 
what purpose the expressive association doctrine serves. Does it 
facilitate expression, or does it provide stand-alone protection 
for groups to manage their internal affairs? The two purposes 
are related, but they are not the same. A fear that homosexual 
men will make advances towards boys is not speech in any sense 
traditionally protected under the speech clause; it is a central 
fact in the exercise of managerial discretion. The same is true of 
feelings of aversion toward blacks or feelings of paternalism and 
condescension toward women. 
There is no general right of disassociation in the Constitu-
tion. If Dale expands the expressive association doctrine to al-
low members of groups that satisfy the standards for public ac-
commodations to exclude persons whom they fear or dislike, but 
who are not the subject of expression based on the common be-
liefs or practices of the group, then the doctrine has taken a large 
step toward becoming a stand-alone right of disassociation 
rather than the instrumental, penumbral doctrine it has been in 
the past. Is that what Dale does? 
102. Dale, 350 U.S. at 655. 
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A. THE RELEVANCE OF EXPRESSIVE PURPOSE 
The majority opinion takes two positions on the question 
whether the Court should analyze the purpose of an organiza-
tion when assessing an expressive association claim. The Court's 
first position is reflected in its finding that the Scouts are an ex-
pressive organization that seeks to teach values. 103 The Court 
reached this conclusion without commenting on why it was rele-
vant, but perhaps this was because the inquiry is so obviously 
necessary to sensible analysis. If the Scouts sold used cars or ran 
pyramid schemes, the case would have been decided differently 
and the Court might have seen no free speech problem at all. 
The Court's second position limited the purpose inquiry. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court had argued that the Scouts must 
admit Dale because they do not associate for the purpose of ex-
pressing views about homosexuality-a point implicit in the 
Scouts' description of their message. In response, the Court said 
"associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of dis-
seminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the pro-
tections of the First Amendment. An association must merely 
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to 
be entitled to protection."104 
The Court went on to say, by way of example, that "the 
purpose of the St. Patrick's Day parade in Hurley was not to es-
pouse any views about sexual orientation, but we held that the 
parade organizers had a right to exclude certain participants 
nonetheless." 105 The Court concluded that whether the Scouts 
associated for the purpose of expressing any message about ho-
mosexuality was irrelevant to the protection of the speech 
clause. 
The Court's approach to expressive purpose is flawed in 
two ways. The first has to do with the Court's use of Hurley as 
precedent. Chief Justice Rehnquist was right to say that in Hur-
ley "the parade organizers did not wish to exclude the GLIB 
members because of their sexual orientations, but because they 
wanted to march behind a GLIB banner."106 No GLIB member 
claimed to have been excluded because of their sexual orienta-
tion from marching as a member of a group otherwise admitted 
103. See text accompanying note 47. 
104. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655. 
105. Id., referring to Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
106. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
2001] MAKING SENSE OF DALE 163 
to the parade. 107 Hurley did not deal with a claim of expression 
resting solely on open homosexuality, which is a harder question 
than whether a group member's more traditional expression as 
part of the group may be controlled. (Nobody disputed that 
Dale could have been expelled from the Scouts for actually 
teaching boys things that were at odds with the Scouts' doctrine.) 
Given this background, that the majority found Hurley such a 
compelling precedent is some evidence that Dale's "activist" ac-
tivity was important to their view of the case. 
Nor did the Court in Hurley ignore the purpose of the asso-
ciation of persons that made up the St. Patrick's Day parade at 
issue in that case. Parades are as purposive as other associations. 
As the Court pointed out in Hurley, a group of people crossing 
the street is not a parade/08 nor is a group of marathon runners. 
Indeed, it is the expressive purpose of an association that makes 
its actions recognizable as a parade: "we use the word "parade" 
to indicate marchers who are making some sort of collective 
point .... "109 That is why the Hurley Court referred to parades 
as "inherently" expressive. To say that Hurley analyzed a pa-
rade as a parade is to say that the Court there took into account 
the purposes around which the association of persons making up 
the parade had formed. 110 
All parades are associations, but not all associations are pa-
rades. Parades are in fact an extreme case of the expressive as-
pect of association. The message of a parade cannot be readily 
separated from the banners of its marchers because the whole 
purpose of the parade is to communicate messages by gathering 
persons together around a common interest or theme, which be-
comes the message of the parade. A St. Patrick's Day parade 
expresses Irish heritage or affinity with it; a Veteran's Day pa-
rade expresses pride in military service and patriotism; an Earth 
Day parade expresses concern for the environment. Earth Day 
marchers may be veterans with Irish roots, but that does not 
mean the Earth Day parade expresses the messages of the other 
two parades. The composition of parade members therefore is 
the message of a parade in a much more direct and transparent 
manner than is the case with other groups. To use a parade as a 
107. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. 
108. Id. at 568. 
109. Id. 
110. That Justice Souter wrote Hurley but dissented in Dale provides some addi-
tional evidence in support of these points. 
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model for analyzing the expressive aspects of association is to 
mistake the extraordinary case for the average.m 
The second flaw in the Court's analysis of purpose is its ef-
fort to divorce the question whether expression has been im-
paired from an analysis of a group's common beliefs and inter-
ests. Under the theory of group expression set forth in Part I, 
one cannot ascertain a group's expression, or whether it will be 
impaired by the admission of some person, without taking into 
account the group's expressive purposes. Impairment is a con-
clusion that describes a contradiction between the relevant char-
acteristics of the person at issue and the beliefs, interests, and 
social practices that define a group and express its message. 
As noted above, this theory of group expression is at least 
consistent with the Court's earlier cases. The Court had spoken 
of a "First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the 
purpose of advancing shared beliefs," 112 and had worried that 
compelled association that might "impair the ability of the origi-
nal members" of a group "to express only those views that 
brought them together."11 Dale's rewording of the language in 
Roberts,114 and the Court's emphasis on deference to a group's 
litigation position, represents a departure from the analytical 
method employed in earlier cases. I turn now to the justification 
for this departure and its implications. 
B. DEFERENCE AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF 
GROUP EXPRESSION 
In the group expression cases leading up to Dale, the Court 
asked whether the organization at issue had produced evidence 
demonstrating that compelled association with women would 
impair its expression. In Roberts the Court said that the "Jay-
cees has failed to demonstrate . . . any serious burden on the 
male members' freedom of expression" and that "there is ... no 
basis in the record for concluding that the admission of 
women ... will impede the organization's ability to engage in 
these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred 
111. Although her general approach to these questions differs from mine, Professor 
Hunter makes a similar point in Hunter, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 25 (cited in note 
2) ("Parades, however unselective or vague in their organizing principles, unquestionably 
exist primarily to serve expressive functions and are perceived as such, unlike most other 
group activities"). 
112. Democratic Party of Wisconsin v. LaFollete, 450 U.S. 107,122 (1981). 
113. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
114. See text accompanying note 34. 
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views. "115 In Duarte the Court said "the evidence fails to demon-
strate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any 
significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their 
various purposes. "116 In New York Club Association, the Court 
said "it is conceivable ... that an association might be able to 
show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that 
it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as ef-
fectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share 
the same sex, for example, or the same religion. "117 
Perhaps for this reason, the Dale Court did not cite these 
cases to explain why it deferred to the assertions in the Scouts' 
briefs. The Court instead first cited Democratic Party of Wis-
consin v. LaFollete,118 which held that Wisconsin could not force 
the Democratic Party to accept at its national convention dele-
gates elected in an open primary. The rule established there was 
"that only those who are willing to affiliate publicly with the 
Democratic Party may participate in the process of selecting 
delegates to the Party's National Convention."119 
The Court in LaFollette did defer to the Democratic Party's 
claim that to allow non-Democrats to elect delegates to the De-
mocratic convention would burden its speech. But LaFollette 
dealt with the question whether persons who did not wish to join 
a group could have a voice in its deliberations. Deferring to the 
claim that someone who was not willing to join the group would 
impair its expression was not a major step, and is consistent with 
the notion that group expression is based on beliefs and interests 
group members hold in common. If the persons at issue shared 
the beliefs and interests of the Democratic Party, why didn't 
they join? 
LaFollette did not address the question whether a group's 
message would be contradicted by the admission of a member 
who endorsed its tenets or by the continued presence of such a 
person who wished to remain in the group.120 Nothing in the case 
115. 468 U.S. at 626. 
116. 481 U.S. at 548. 
117. 487 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). 
118. 450 u.s. 107 (1981). 
119. ld. at 109. The Court cited with approval Professor Tribe's characterization of 
the expressive right as one keyed to a group's common beliefs and interests: "Freedom of 
association would prove an empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over 
their decisions to those who share the interests and persuasions that underlie the associa-
tion's being." Id. at 122 n.22, quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 791 (Foun-
dation Press, 1978). 
120. In Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 576 (2000), the Court described the 
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suggests that a court may not analyze the relationship between a 
group's common beliefs and interests and the personal charac-
teristics of one who agrees to abide by its rules but whom the 
group wishes to exclude. The question was simply not pre-
sented.121 
The Dale Court's second citation for its deference to the 
Scouts' litigation position was to Thomas v. Review Board, 122 a 
case that did not actually address a question of expressive asso-
ciation. Thomas worked at a foundry that closed, resulting in his 
transfer within the firm to a division that made tank turrets. 
Thomas's religious views allowed him to work at the foundry, 
which might have made metal that went into tanks, but not the 
turret-plant, which was directly involved in making weapons. 
Perhaps finding this distinction elusive, and noting that 
other workers who shared Thomas's faith were willing to make 
tank turrets,123 the Indiana courts denied Thomas unemployment 
benefits on the ground that he had quit because of personal phi-
losophical beliefs rather than religious conviction. The Court 
reversed, saying "the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to 
beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious 
sect. ,124 
Thomas holds that courts may not parse the tenets of a re-
ligion to assess the plausibility of a member's interpretation. Dif-
ferences of interpretation within a faith are to be expected. 
Courts in free exercise cases may not try to choose between 
competing interpretations. The ruling makes clear that an indi-
issue in LaFollette as whether a rule "allowing nonparty members to participate in the 
selection of the party's nominee conflicted with the Democratic Party's rules. We held 
that, whatever the strength of the state interests supporting the open primary itself, they 
could not justify this 'substantial intrusion into the associational freedom of members of 
the National Party."' (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 126). Consistent with my analysis 
here the Court in Jones defined the burden on First Amendment interests in LaFollette 
as "'intrusion by those with adverse political principles' upon the selection of the party's 
nominee .... " Id. at 576 n.7 (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 122, quoting Ray v. Blair, 
343 u.s. 214,221-22 (1952)). 
121. The Court docs not always read LaFollette as precluding the examination of 
record evidence. In Jones the Court relied on LaFollette while discussing survey evi-
dence and expert testimony in the record. The Court invalidated California's blanket 
primary law in part on the ground that "the evidence in this case demonstrates that un-
der California's blanket primary system, the prospect of having a party's nominee deter-
mined by adherents of an opposing party is far from remote-indeed, it is a clear and 
present danger." I d. at 578. 
122. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
123. The Indiana Supreme Court seemed to take this fact as evidence that Thomas's 
interpretation was an aberration of doctrine. 450 U.S. at 715. 
124. ld. at 715-16. 
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vidual's free exercise rights extend to sincere religious convic-
tions even if those convictions deviate significantly from the pre-
vailing view of a religious group. In brief, Thomas rightly pro-
tects a highly individual conception of faith and a right to free 
exercise of that faith unconstrained by the views of others within 
the relevant denomination. 
Because it protects such an individual conception of faith, 
Thomas is a weak precedent for problems of group expression. 
Thomas had a free exercise right to maintain and follow highly 
personal interpretations of doctrine. It does not follow that the 
Jehovah's Witnesses as a group expressed his interpretation, ei-
ther internally or to the world at large. Indeed, so long as Tho-
mas's beliefs satisfied the general standards the Court has estab-
lished for sincere religious belief, his free exercise right would 
not expire even if the Jehovah's Witnesses unanimously rejected 
his interpretation by public ballot. It would be untenable in that 
case to claim that the denomination itself expressed Thomas's 
views, however. 
Thomas serves more to highlight the differences between an 
individual's free exercise right and the expression of a group 
than to support the Court's opinion. In the context of Scouting, 
for example, religious organizations sponsoring Scout troops 
may each maintain a view on drinking wine or on the importance 
of Jesus. These views may vary among and within sponsors. 
Such variance does not restrict any sponsor's group or individual 
right to their religious beliefs. It does suggest that the Scouts as a 
whole have no common beliefs on wine-drinking or the impor-
tance of Jesus. Under the theory of group expression set out in 
Part One, it would follow that the Scouts, as a group, express no 
views on these subjects. The same is true with respect to homo-
sexuality. 
Complete deference would solve the problem of measuring 
group expression by saying that expression itself was not neces-
sary for constitutional protection. The First Amendment would 
then protect disassociation in its own right on the ground that it 
related to freedom of conscience in general if not free exercise in 
particular. This position cannot be squared with the Court's 
statement that expressive associations cannot "erect a shield 
against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere ac-
ceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its 
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message."125 It also contradicts the many cases treating expres-
sive association as an instrumental doctrine designed to facilitate 
expression. An alternative interpretation is therefore prefer-
able. 
On their facts, LaFollette and Thomas each seem less rele-
vant to Dale than either Roberts or Duarte. In each of the latter 
cases the organization at issue had an "official position" with re-
spect to women and their effect on the group's message, but in 
neither case was that official position "sufficient for First 
Amendment purposes." 126 On its face, the very general message 
of "moral straightness" the Scouts defended in Dale was closer 
to the case of the Rotary than of an organization with a well-
defined message, such as the NRA.127 If we assume that the state 
interests in each case were equivalent-the elimination of dis-
crimination against a group the state's legislature chose to pro-
tect- then on the analytical approach in Dale both Roberts and 
Duarte would have been decided differently.128 
125. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
126. The Court in fact quoted the language from both Roberts and Duarte that re-
ferred to its scrutiny of evidence in those cases, but made no mention of such analysis in 
distinguishing those cases on the ground that in each of them that "the organizations' 
First Amendment rights were not violated by the application of the States' public ac-
commodations laws." Dale, 530 U.S. at 658. 
127. As noted above, the Scouts gave particularized content to this message only in 
the context of litigation, and they made essentially no effort to connect their assertion to 
common beliefs or interests that define the Scouts and their practices. 
128. A realist analysis of the case would ask whether the opinion reflects an unstated 
conviction that New Jersey's interest in securing equal access to public accommodations 
for gays and lesbians was not as strong as its interest in securing equal access for women 
or members of minority groups at whom such statutes have been directed in the past. 
Questioning at argument provides a basis for such speculation: 
QUESTION: Well, Mr. Wolfson, if we compare the antidiscrimination laws 
such as New Jersey has enacted with the sort of Fourteenth Amendment princi-
ples of equal protection, the-you know, we start out with people, with kind of 
immutable characteristics, blacks, national origin, and then presumably homo-
sexuals are not quite the same. Supposing we would get even further. l-one of 
the briefs does, the City of Boston, includes in its prohibition against discrimi-
nation ex-convicts. Now, supposing New Jersey were to pass a law like that. At 
some point the compelling State interest is considerably dissipated, isn't it? .... 
QUESTION: But wouldn't the State's interest be weaker if we're talking 
about, say, ex-convicts being discriminated against than it would about blacks 
being discriminated against? 
MR. WOLFSON: Well, as this Court has clearly acknowledged, for exam-
ple, in the Romer case and in the Hurley case, here it talked about the legiti-
macy and appropriateness of State Civil Rights laws that include sexual onenta-
tion discrimination within the cluster of prohibited classifications, in Romer the 
Court-
QUESTION: Well, that doesn't really answer my question at all. I asked 
you if the State interest would be weaker if we were talking about ex-convicts. 
2000 WL 489419 at *24-25. 
Supreme Court transcripts do not identify questioners. Dale's Counsel responded to 
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Nevertheless, Dale was different from Roberts and Duarte 
in two respects the Court might have discussed as a basis for 
bringing its holding in line with these precedents. Most impor-
tantly, language in both Roberts and Duarte suggested that those 
groups had significant economic components to their activities 
and expression. They could to some extent be considered "net-
working" organizations. On the continuum between a retail 
store and the LDS Church, they fell closer to the former than the 
latter; for the Scouts the reverse is true. It is in this sense that 
LaFollette and Thomas might be considered more analogous to 
Dale than Roberts or Duarte. 
One therefore may and probably should read the Dale 
Court as establishing a sliding scale of deference based on the 
Court's view of how central expression is to a group's purpose. 
Hybrid commercial groups get more exacting scrutiny, while 
more purely expressive groups get greater deference. This read-
ing obviously makes the Court's initial purpose inquiry-in 
which it classifies a group as expressive, not expressive, or 
somewhere in between- tremendously important. This reading 
also suggests the Court was more willing to make decisions and 
draw distinctions about the Scouts' interests and practices than 
its deferential language suggests. 
Second, and more speculatively, the expressive activities at 
issue in Roberts and Duarte involved adults. 129 The Scouts' ex-
pression is at least formally directed toward boys. The amicus 
brief from which I have drawn the views of Group Three sug-
gests that boxs cannot separate a message from the messenger 
conveying it. 30 Perhaps the Court could have analyzed the re-
cord and developed a theory of expressive identity bounded by 
the facts of the case and the limited ability of this young audi-
ence to parse the message at issue. We do not know whether 
this approach would have worked, however, because the Court 
did not make this effort. 131 
the first question, however, by addressing Chief Justice Rehnquist. New Jersey's statute 
does not protect sexual orientation differently from race or gender. If the Court drew 
such a distinction, and if this influenced its holding, then the Court's opinion does not 
adequately explain the basis for its decision. Because the opinion docs not address the 
issue, Dale should not be read as a holding one way or another with respect to the weight 
of New Jersey's interest. 
129. The Jaycees admitted men from 18 to 35. RobertS, 468 U.S. at 613; the Rotary 
said it was an organization of "business and professional men." Duarte, 481 U.S. at 540. 
130. 2000 WL at 235234. 
131. Because the Court did not develop a theory of expressive identity, any such ef-
fort would be difficult. If there were evidence suggesting that boys were aware of Dale's 
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C. DEFERENCE AS SECOND-BEST? 
A defender of the Court's opinion might respond to this cri-
tique as follows. Courts are not well suited to analyzing the mes-
sages of an organization. Perhaps the Court's approach pre-
vented it from seeing that a majority of persons associated with 
Scouting might think that homosexuality is morally straight yet 
still be afraid of having gay men as Scoutmasters. And perhaps 
the Court's approach gave the protection of the speech clause to 
the Scouts even though as a group they express no message that 
Dale's presence would contradict. Even taking all that as true, a 
defender might argue, the Court's approach was correct because 
judicial scrutiny of a group's beliefs presents a risk of chilling 
rights of expressive association that outweighs any harm from 
excessive deference. Perhaps the Court had something like this 
in mind when it chose to defer to the Scouts' assertions about 
their expression and what would impair it. 
Formalism has its places in law. The boundary between 
group expression and anti-discrimination laws is not one of 
them. 132 Assessing relative error costs requires that we assign 
values to the losses on each side. Doing that requires judgment. 
Saying that the speech clause may be invoked in defense of si-
lence requires judgment about the purposes of expressive asso-
ciation and the facts of particular cases. Saying that Courts are 
competent enough to distinguish expressive organizations from 
other sorts, but not to determine whether an organization actu-
ally expresses a message, or whether that message relates to the 
characteristics of a person the organization wishes to exclude, 
requires judgment as well. To take these points as obvious is 
simply to duck the issue. 
The fact of the matter is that courts cannot analyze expres-
sive association claims sensibly without analyzing the expres-
siveness of a group and its actual expression. The only real 
questions are what purposes the expressive association doctrine 
serves, and how closely the Court's analysis, and its understand-
ing of how groups express messages, will track those purposes. 
"activist" expression, however, the Court might be able to develop a theory arguing that 
boys could not distinguish between a Scoutmaster's role in the Scouts and that person's 
conduct outside the Scouts. 
132. A truly formal approach to the compelled expression argument would be that 
once New Jersey had forced the admission of gays into the Scouts then the presence of 
gays would communicate only compliance with the law, not approval of homosexuality. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND AN ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACH 
171 
One who offers so much critique is obliged to explain how 
things could have been done better. I will begin by offering 
what I believe is the best distillation of the facts, rhetoric, and 
outcome in Dale. I then discuss an alternative approach to the 
case. 
A. DISCRETION TO FACILITATE EXPRESSION 
To make sense of Dale one has to take into account both 
the Court's statement that groups cannot defeat anti-
discrimination laws "simply by asserting that mere acceptance of 
a member from a particular group would impair its message"133 
and its strong statements of deference to the Scouts' litigation 
claims. The former point means that the Court has not created a 
stand-alone right of disassociation. In particular, the Court has 
not extended constitutional protection to the managerial discre-
tion of groups except to the extent that discretion is exercised to 
facilitate actual activity protected by the First Amendment. The 
latter point confirms that managerial discretion, including con-
trol over membership, is a material part of the doctrine. 
Under the expressive association doctrine after Dale, 
managerial discretion is protected to give breathing space to 
actual expression. To receive constitutional protection against 
anti-discrimination laws an expressive association must actually 
express a message. At some point the relationship between that 
message and the exercise of managerial discretion will be too at-
tenuated to warrant constitutional protection for managerial de-
cisions such as the exclusion of prospective members. Dale does 
not explain how closely the exercise of discretion must relate to 
actual expression to obtain constitutional protection against anti-
discrimination laws. We can conclude only that expression is the 
core of the doctrine and managerial discretion is penumbral. 
The degree of discretion granted to an organization will 
vary with the facts of actual cases. As noted above, the more 
central expression is to a group's purpose, the more discretion it 
is likely to receive. Facts relating to persons seeking admission 
are relevant here as well. Because the Court characterized Dale 
as an activist, for example, the Scouts' leadership probably re-
ceived more leeway than it otherwise would have. To the extent 
this is true, we may infer that the Court felt the Scouts could dis-
133. 530 U.S. at 653. 
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tance themselves from Dale at least in part because the Court 
seemed to perceive him as fairly shouting a message on a topic 
the Scouts wanted to avoid. 
B. FOLLOW THE SPEECH 
Dale is a hard case in large part because the Scouts are a de-
centralized group that expresses messages locally. This is proba-
bly not the last time courts will see such a structure in an expres-
sive association context. Rather than ignoring the group's 
structure and using deference and quick peeks at the record to 
fill in the resulting gaps in evidence, the Court could have con-
fronted the structure squarely and held that in expressive asso-
ciation cases constitutional protection attaches to the expression, 
at whatever level the expression occurs. 
On this approach, the Court would look past the Scouts' 
formal litigation position to the troops that do the actual teach-
ing and analyze those messages under the traditional expressive 
association doctrine. Whether openly gay men could be Scout-
masters would then be determined on a troop-by-troop basis in 
light of the expression actually at issue. 
This approach has the virtue of confronting the evidence 
suggesting that Scout sponsors and troops do not have common 
beliefs and interests respecting homosexuality, and therefore ex-
press no group message on homosexuality. Under this ap-
proach, the Scouts as a group therefore would not have a right to 
exclude Dale. Troops that did express a message condemning 
homosexuality would have a right to exclude Dale. This would 
be particularly true of troops sponsored by groups, such as the 
Catholic Church or the LDS Church, that integrate Scouting into 
their youth ministries. (Group Two members would have no 
claim against admitting Dale, but by hypothesis they would not 
bring one.) 
This approach also would give teeth to the Court's state-
ment that mere assertions that compelled association would im-
pair speech are not enough to defeat anti-discrimination laws. 
We can see this point by applying this approach to Group One 
members, who do not want gay Scoutmasters but who have no 
message on homosexuality. A decentralized approach in which 
constitutional protection follows expression implies that Group 
One members have no expressive association defense against 
New Jersey's laws. 
2001] MAKING SENSE OF DALE 173 
This approach would prevent discrimination based on fears 
unrelated to protected expression, such as the fear that gay 
Scoutmasters might make sexual advances toward boys. Fear of 
sexual abuse is not speech in the constitutional sense, nor are 
representations and membership policies designed to keep up 
demand for the Scouts' services by palliating such fears. 134 If the 
Court does not tie its analysis to actual expression, it is hard to 
see how the Court could determine whether a membership pol-
icy was based on unprotected fears rather than protected expres-
ston. 
This approach has costs. Looking past the Scouts' litigation 
position and engaging in a troop-by-troop analysis might frag-
ment the Scouts' "morally straight" message even further, and 
reduce the cohesiveness of the national group. The message ap-
pears to be only nominal in any event, however. It is speculation 
to suggest that the Court's decision would result in further frag-
mentation.135 
The Scouts could of course introduce evidence showing that 
the message they defended is actually widely expressed at the 
troop level. In that case this approach would produce the same 
result as the Court's deferential approach. That result would be 
grounded in the evidence, however, and would pose a lower risk 
of protecting unvoiced fears rather than constitutionally pro-
tected expression. In any event, this approach is not static. If 
the Scouts as a whole were able to develop a unified message on 
the question of homosexuality, whatever it might be, then pre-
sumably they could point to facts showing what the message was, 
that it was actually expressed, and explain how it related to the 
characteristics of a person the Scouts wished to exclude. Noth-
ing more would be required. 
Another objection to this approach is that there is no logical 
reason to stop at the troop level once the Court decides to look 
past the representations of the national organization. Troops are 
sponsored by groups; why not look past the sponsoring organiza-
134. Suppose, for example, that the Scouts' representations about policies designed 
to guard against sexual activity arc false. If a parent of an abused child included a mis-
representation claim in a suit against the Scouts, assuming the parent could prove reli-
ance and the other elements of the claim, could the Scouts assert a First Amendment de-
fense? At least if we assume that the Scouts' representations, which are designed to 
induce trust, are instrumental, such a claim would be unlikely to succeed. See note 64. 
135. As the Scouts pointed out, they litigated this issue for some time. That they did 
not mtroduce better evtdence that the message they defended is actually expressed at the 
troop level suggests that, with respect to the term "morally straight" and its relationship 
to homoscxuahty, the Scouts have httle m the way of a unified message to fragment. 
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tions to see what the individual members think? Where does 
one draw the line? It is true that focusing on the troop level is a 
choice. I suggest it here because, using the theory of group ex-
pression set out in Part I as the test of group expression, the facts 
recounted in Part III suggest that the troop level is where the 
Scouts' messages are expressed. 
A last objection to this approach is that this level of scrutiny 
compels private citizens to declare private beliefs in order to 
avoid associating with persons to whom they object. Group One 
members who actually believe that homosexuality is morally 
wrong but who do not wish to. say so would be able to avoid 
openly gay Scoutmasters only by teaching their convictions, 
thereby shifting themselves to Group Three. This objection is 
true, but it is not unique to the Scouts. Giving groups a free 
speech defense to an anti-discrimination rule creates an incen-
tive to reveal private preferences. If we assume for the moment 
that the American Society of Professional Journalists could be 
subjected to an anti-discrimination law, then it would be open to 
racist members to create the American Society of White Jour-
nalists. 
There are both costs and benefits to creating incentives to 
reveal such information. At a minimum, persons considering 
whether to join a group would have better information about its 
common tenets. In addition, some persons who might discrimi-
nate privately might be unwilling to do so if their actions could 
be perceived. Persons or legislators who seek to use anti-
discrimination laws to alter social attitudes about the members 
of protected groups would count this effect a benefit. As noted, 
much case law and legislation follows this view.136 Persons who 
fear majority imposition of values would see the disclosure in-
centives as harmful-an intrusion by the state into matters of 
conscience. 
Legally the question again comes down to what the right is 
protecting. If it is expression, then the information-forcing effect 
of this structure is neutral and perhaps beneficial. If the right 
protects the managerial discretion of groups standing alone, then 
this effect counts as harm. Because Dale establishes neither a 
freestanding right of disassociation, nor a theory of complete 
managerial discretion, this objection is not conclusive. 
136. See note 65. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Dale was a hard case. There was a lot of noise surrounding 
the decision, but paying close attention to the facts yields usable 
signals as well. Personal characteristics are not inherently ex-
pressive; there is no free speech right to exclude persons from a 
public accommodation just because one finds them repugnant; 
and managerial discretion is protected only as an adjunct to ac-
tual expression, which is what the First Amendment protects. 
The extent to which discretion enjoys constitutional protection 
will probably vary with the degree to which expression is central 
to a group's purpose and with the facts relevant to the person 
whose admission to the group is at issue. 
The relationship between discretion and expression is com-
plex, and beyond these points Dale did little to clarify it. The 
Court's recasting of the Scouts as equivalent to an individual 
speaker instead of a group was not accompanied by any reason-
ing. The view of group expression implied by Roberts and dis-
cussed in Part I is more defensible and ultimately provides a 
sounder basis for the doctrine than either the Dale Court's per-
sonification of groups or its statements of deference. One hopes 
the Court will return to that view in future cases. 
